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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to inquire into the significant features 
of United States Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) and Japanese DFI in Korean 
manufacturing industry and to compare the determinants, motivating factors, 
and technology transfer associated with DFI. The hypothesis put forward by 
Kojima provides a theoretical framework to test. This study examines three 
propositions derived from Kojima's work. First, Kojima observed that United 
States DFI is domestic-market-oriented and Japanes DFI is export-oriented ln 
Korean manufacturing industry. Second, it is shown that DFI in Korea by 
United States firms, especially by the large oligopolistic firms, is undertaken 
mostly to exploit non-marketable, firm-specific advantage in production 
technology, management and marketing. However, Japanese DFI is undertaken 
primarily to exploit an advantage in location-specific marketing skill as 
well as non-marketable and firm-specific. Third, Kojima (hypothesis III) 
suggests that the United States level of technology transfer is higher than 
that of Japan. 
Methodology: SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was used 
to find out whether or not there is a significant difference between the 
United States level of technology transfer and the Japanese level of technology 
transfer. The main focus of the case study of the machinery industry is 
given to tabulating and crosstabulating countrY-by-technology level, country-
by-contents of technology transfer and country-by-periods by using the SPSS 
technique. Signficant results can also be drawn from the empirical test. 
First, the results are consistent with Kojima's observation that United States 
DFI is domestic-market-oriented and Japanese DFI is export-oriented in Korean 
manufacturing industry. Second, it is known that an advantage in location-
specific marketing skill is not a significant condition for Japanese DFI. 
Third, it appears that the major determinants of technology level by DFI depends 
not only on firm-specificity but also (a) investment climate of the investing 
country, United States or Japan (b) technology level of the host country 
(c) comparative advantage in the host country (d) demand, market size of the 
host country (e) industrial policy of the host government and the investment 
climate of the host country. These are some of the factors which would have 
to be taken into account beyond those identified by Kojima. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
As evidenced hy the wide scope of the literature on DFI (Direct 
Foreign Investment), there are many possible perspectives in a study 
of this subject . Studies have focused on the determinants, character-
istics, motivation, cost and benefit of investment. Total DFI approved 
by the Korean government amounted to $703 million during the period 
1962-74. Of this sum $664 million, ~4.5 per cent of the total, was of 
United States and Japan origin . Given the dominance of United States 
and Japanese DFI in Korea, the focus of this study will be on exploring 
and comparing the salient features of DFI from these two countries l . 
The purpose of the present study is to inquire into the signif-
icant features of United States DFI and Japanese DFI in Korean 
manufacturing industry and to compare the determinants, motivating 
factors, and technology transfer associated with DFI. The hypothesis 
put forward by Kojima2 provides a theoretical framework to test in the 
remaining chapters. 
This study will deal with all the forms of direct foreign private 
investment, whether wholly-owned or joint-ventures, and whether 
mul tinationals or not, in the manufacturing industry of Korea. Those 
sources of data are employed in this study are as follows. The first 
kjnd of data consists of published 'official' data, including 
Statistical Yearbooks, the Present State of Technology Licensing 
Agreements by EPB (1962-1978.6), Technology Transfer (Quarterly 
Journal by KIST 1980, Spring), and so on. Data of this kind are too 
aggregative to be completely satisfactory to a microeconomic analysis 
of the behavior of foreign investors. The second kind of data consist 
of the orginal data sheets filled out by individual foreign firms 
1. Economic Planning Board (EPB) , ROK, 'Major Statistics of Korean 
Economy, 1977. 
2. K. Kojima, 'Direct Foreign Investment', 1979. 
1 
covered in the Korean Government's recent surveyl on the operations 
of foreign-invested firms . The special survey on foreign firms that 
was carried out in the mid-1978 has proved to be most useful to this 
study . The third kind of data from recent sources, namely is Lee's 
(1979)2 study and Park ' s (1980)3 study. Those two recent studies 
give some guidelines for t he present study and valuable intuitions. 
2. TREND AND PATTERN OF DFI IN KOREA 
In August, 1962, the first case of direct foreign private 
investment project, a United States-Korean joint-venture firm producing 
nylon filaments, was approved byti1e Government of the Repubulic of 
Korea. The company was joint l y established by ~Iankuk Nylon Co. on the 
Korean side and Chemtex Inc . on the United States side, with an initial 
equity capi t al of US $1,370,000 and a 50:50 equity ratio. As shown in 
Table I-I, the number of foreign investment projects increased steadily 
up to 1967 rapidly increased from 1968 to 1974, and then dropped sharply 
between 1975 and 1976 . At the end of 1976, the total number of foreign-
invested firms operating in Korea was 865, and the total value of 
foreign investment amounted to $953,724,000. 
From the inception of direct foreign investment in 1962 to the 
end of 1968, the United States was the single largest investor, and 
accounted for 81.7 per cent of the total value of US $74.8 million at 
the end of 1968. Japan invested only US $5.9 million, accounting for 
only 7.9 per cent of the total value of investment for the same period. 
A quite reverse trend can be noted after 1967 as a turning point, as 
shown in Table 1-2. From 1967 on, Japanese investment has grown far 
more rapidly than the United States investment in terms of both the 
number and total value of investment projects. 
1. EPB, 'Economic Annlysis of Poreign Direct Investment', (in Korean), 
1980. 
2. C.H. Lee, ' Direct Foreign Investment in Korea,' KIEI, Seoul, Korea, 
1979 . 
3 . E. Y. Park, ' DFI of Multinationals and Technology Transfer,' KDI, 
working paper, (in Korean), 1980. 
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TABLE I-I TREND IN FOREIGN EQUITY INVESTMENT APPROVED (As of the 
End 1976) 
Unit: thousand U.S. dollars 
Year No. of Project Amount 
1962 1 3,927 
1963 3 5,623 
1964 2 333 
1965 6 20,910 
1966 8 1,524 
1967 14 12,869 
1968 25 12,036 
1969 32 34,737 
1970 74 58,700 
1971 80 32,537 
1972 145 122,938 
1973 271 262,246 
1974 120 120,685 
1975 41 199,553 
1976 44 65,106 
Total 865 953,724 
Sources: Economic Planning Board (EPB), Summary of Foreign 
Equity Investment Approval 1977. 
The predominance of Japanese investment was much more pronounced between 
1972 and 1976 than before. Investment by Japan and United States made 
up about 89.5 per cent of total DFI in Korea during 1972-76~ 
3 
TABLE 1-2 FOREIGN EQUITY INVESTMENT BY COUNTRY (on arrival basis) 
Unit : thousand U. S. dollars 
Year 1962-1966 967-1971 1972-197.6 1977 1978 Total 
Number Amount compoJ NOP Amount Compo - NOP Amount Compo- NOP Amount Compo- NOP. Amount Compo- NOP Amount Compo-
Country of sition sition sition sition sition sition 
Project (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
-
United 
States 8 22,614 96 . 9 26 26,853 38.0 34 98,040 22 . 3 ~O 10,142 7 . 9 8 17,157 12 . 3 86 174,806 21 . 7 
Japan 1 186 0.8 70 26,380 35 . 8 338 296,064 67.2 ~2 76 , 952 59 . 8 ~5 67,238 48 . 1 436 466,820 57 . 9 
Others 2 53 8 2 . 3 16 20,357 26.2 26 46,264 10.5 7 41 , 604 32 . 3 5 55 , 407 . ~ 39 . 6 56 164 , 170 20.4 
Total 11 23 , 338 112 73 , 590 39 8 44 0,368 ~9 128 ,698 28 139,802 578 805,796 
-
Source: EPB , Economic Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment, 1980. 
This survey covers 593 foreign-firms during the period 1962-78. 
~ 
Table 1-2 shows more detail about the share in total number of 
projects and total foreign investment by all countries during 1962-1978. 
The share of United States in total foreign investment was 21.7 per cent 
and, of Japan, 57 . 9 per cent on arrival basis at the end of 1978. 
Japanese projects totalled 436 as against 86 for the United States, 
glvlng a combined number of 522 (90.3 per cent) out of a .total of 578 
projects on arrival basis (see Table 1-3). 
TABLE 1-3 THE CURRENT STATE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY COUNTRY 
(on arrival basis). (As of the End of 1978) 
Unit: thousand U.S. dollars 
Number of Amount Composition 
Project per cent 
United 
States 86 174,806 21.7 
Japan 436 466,820 57.9 
Others 56 164,170 20.4 
Total 578 805,796 100.0 
Source: EPB, Economic Analysis, 1980. 
TABLE 1-4 THE CURRENT STATE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY INDUSTRY 












Source : EPB, Economic An1aysis, 1980. 













It is interesting to note that the average SIze of the United 
States investment for the period between 1962 and 1978 was about 
US $2.0 million whereas that of Japanese investment for the same period 
w~s only US $1 .0 million. About 20.9 per cent of all the Japanese 
investment was undertaken by Korean residents in Japan, mainly due to the 
rapid growth of investment in tertiary sector, especially the hotel 
and tourist industry. As shown in Table 1-4, manufacturing industry 
held a 74.5 per cent share in total investment at the end of 1978. 
3. NATURE OF UNITED STATES DFI AND JAPANESE DFI IN KOREAN 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
United States and Japanese DFI in Korean manufacturing industry 
have a number of distinctive features. 
(1) The growth of Japanese DFI was fostered particularly after 1968. 
The share in total amount of investment by United States DFI and 
Japanese DFI was 84:5 in per cent during 1962-67 and 22:66 in per 
cent at the end of 1974, showing a big reversal in priority. 
(2) It is interesting to observe that the average amount invested by 
the Japanese DFI increased from US $0.5 million during 1962-74 to 
6 
US $1 .0 7 million during 1962-1978.6 whereas the average amount invested 
by the United States DFI in Korea was US $2 .0 million during the 
1962-1978.6 period. The smaller investment in Korea was done by Japanese 
DFI, for example , the proportion of firms which invested less than US $0.2 
million was 49.5 per cent whereas for the United States it was 32 per 
cent. 
(3) It is Japan's small-and medium-sized manufacturers \<Jhich are active 
investors in Korea and who produce relatively unsophisticated products 
overseas. For eXaJ11ple, the ratio of manufacturing investments made 
by these small firms to the total number of manufacturing investment 
IS 70.0 per cent 111 Korea1 . In COJlll';lsL, till i t e tl St;ltes DI : \ i.s 
1. Agency of Small and Medium Enterprises, '1976 Chusho Kigyo Hakusho', 
(1976 White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises), Tokyo. p.4l. 
carried out relatively by big United States firms, for instance, 
investment by those big United States firms account for 55 per cent 
in Korea. 
(4) As to the sources of t echnolo gy introduced in Korean manufacturing 
industry, United States and Japanese were the major suppliers and 
accounted for 22 per cent and 62 per cent of technology flow respectively 
during 1962-1978 according to the recent Quarterly Journal, Technology 
licensing agreements . 
(5) There is evidence that Japanese firms are, on the whole, more 
inclined to accept minority ownership than United States firms. 
According to the economic survey made in 1980 by EPB l , minority 
ownership (less than 50 per cent equity ownership) accounts for 53 
per cent of 414 Japanese overseas ventures, while United States accounts 
for 33 per cent. During 1962-74, ownership pattern of OFI in Korea 
was slightly different, for example, 52 per cent of investment from 
Japan and 27 per cent of investment from United States involved 
minority ownership. 
(6) 'Group investment' (for example, where a number of J apanese firms, 
usually involving trading companies, participate in a given overseas 
venture as co-investors) is a popular form of overseas investment 
2 
among Japanese firms in Korea. According to Ozawa (1971) , a 
general trading company and a manufacturer each contribute a quarter 
of equity capital, the rest being supplied by local participants. 
The general trading company in return controls the shipping of 
machinery, equipment, raw materials, and semi-finished products from 
Japan to the oversegs venture as well as the export of its products. 
In the absence of genera l trading companies small Japanese manufacturers 
ln Korea would not have been able to make DFI. 
1. EPB, " Ec onomic Analysis ... , ' 1980 . op. ci t. , 
2 . T . Oxawa, 'Transfer of Technology from Japan to Developing 
Countries', UNITAR, Research Reports No.7, 1971. 
7 
TABLE 1-5* NUMBER OF TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AGREEMENTS BY COUNTRY AND BY INDUSTRY (1962-78) 
Indus try Textile Petro- Metal Electric t'-lachinery Electric 
Industry Chemicals Industry and and Power 
Country (Including and Chem- Electronic t'-Iachine (Including 
Synthetic Engineer- Machinery Parts Nuclear 
fiber) lng Power) 
United 
States 19 48 15 49 64 13 
Japan 25 124 60 168 233 9 
Others 5 32 22 26 63 5 
Total 49 204 97 243 360 27 
Source: Technolo gy Transfer, Quarterly Journal, Spring 1980, KIST (in Korean). pp.20-22. 











4. THE OUTLINE OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
Now, we provide an outline of what the present study does chapter 
by chapter. Chaper 2 attempts to set out in detail the theoretical 
framework of the thesis from Kojima's work and identify the hypothesis 
which will be tested . We compare the different characteristics of 
the Japanese DFI and American DFI and examine Japanese type DFI (a model 
of trade-oriented DFI) and American type (a model of anti-trade-oriented 
DFI) . TI1is is followed by some criticisms of the model. Finally we 
introduce some propositions derived form Kojima's work as the 
theoretical framework of this s t udy and they will be examined In 
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detail through the next chapt ers. The ' descriptive' aspect of Kojima's, lS 
subject to further empirical investigation here, particularly 
t echnology transfer level of investing country. 
In Chapter 3, a summary of the literature and evidence on 
descriptive part of Kojima's hypothesis will be presented and we compare 
and provide evidence about the market-orientation -- export-orientation 
or domestic-orientation -- of United States and Japanese DFI in Korea 
and other distinctive features of the descriptive aspect of Kojima's 
and analyse the difference in the factors motivating United States 
and Japanese DFI in Korea. The study attempts to support the hypothesis 
that factors motivating United States DFI in Korea were non-marketable, 
firm-specific advantages in production management and marketing 
techniques whereas the factor motivating Japanese DFI in Korea was 
non-marketable, firm-and-Iocation specific advantage in marketing 
technique and not in production and management. The study notes 
some of the factors that would have to be taken into account beyond 
these factors. 
Chopter 4 explores the important aspect of Japanese transfer 
of technology to developing countries and American transfer of 
technology and summarizes the important aspect of the Japanese type 
transfer of technology, comparing with United States type .transfer of 
technology by Kojima. According to Kojima ' s hypothesis, owing to the 
degree of development and industrial structure, he assumes that 
there are significant differences in the level of technology transfer 
of investing countries . He assumes that United States technology level 
of transfer is higher than that of Japan. In other words, his 
hypothesis suggests that there is a very small gap between Korean 
technology and American technology level. First, we attempt to show 
some evidence to support the validity of this hypothesis and an 
empirical case study of the machinery industry will be presented 
as a way of checking the validity of the hypothesis ln Chapter 
4, uSlng SPSS technique. 
10 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE KOJI~~'S HYPOTHESIS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The major theories advanced by the western economist (like the 
organization approach l or product life cycle approach2) to explain 
DFI help us understand the behaviour of foreign firms operating in 
Korea but leave many aspects of investment unexplained. Kojima's 
hypothesis provides a different theoretical/explanatory framework both 
for American investment and Japanese investment. Since DFI in 
Korea is predominantly from the America and Japan, it is worthwhile 
testing some aspects of Kojima's hypothesis in Korean data. 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out In detail the theoretical 
framework from Kojima's hypothesis and identify the hypothesis which 
will be tested. Section 2 compares the different characteristics of 
the Japanese OFI and American OFI and section 3 examines Japanese 
type DFI (a model of trade-oriented DFI) and American type (a model 
of anti-trade-oriented DFI). This is followed by some criticisms 
of the model set out. In section 4, we introduce some hypothesis 
from Kojima as theoretical framework of this present study and 
they will be examined in detail through next chapters. 
In his Japan and a New World Economic Order3 (1977) and Direct 
4 Foreign Investment (1978), Kojima contends that whereas Japanese 
DFI complements have comparative advantage in trade and is thus 
' anti-trade-oriented' . According to Kojima, a major portion of 
Japanese DFI in manufacturing industries has been confined to such 
unskilled labour-intensive processing industries as assembly of 
(1) R.E. Caves, 'Industrial orgaization', in John.H . Dunning (ed.), 
Economic Analysis and the ~lul tinatj onal Enterprise (London: George 
All en (JnJ Unwin Ltcl., 1974), p. 130. 
(2) R. Vernon, 'International investment and international trade In 
the product life cycle', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol, lxxx 
(~1:1Y 1966), P1'. 190-207. 
(3) K. Kojima, 'Japan and a New World Economic Order', 1977, pp. 92-99. 
(4) K. Kojima, 'Direct Foreign Investment', 1977, pp. 145-164 . 
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motor vehicles and the production of parts and components, for 
electronic machinery. These are in fact those industries in which 
Japan has been losing her comparative advantage and through OFI Japan 
has substituted the export of machinery and technological knowhow 
for the export of final products. Kojima further observes that 
American OFI has been carried out by large 'oligopolistic' firms 
I that rank at the top of the American comparative advantage scale . 
2 . CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAPANESE OFI TYPE ANO AMERICAN OFI TYPE 
In illl attempt to identify the characteristics of two different 
12 
types of OFI, trade-oriented (the Japanese model) and anti-trade-oriented 
(the American model) foreign investment, Krause and Sekiguchi (1979)2 
summarized the 'descriptive ' part of Kojima's hypothesis. 
The Kojima hypothesis has two parts, a descriptive part and a 
normative part. The 'descriptive' part of the hypothesis is as 
follows : Japan ' s OFI comes from older industries in Japan that are 
no longer able to compete successfully for domestic and export markets; 
it generally involves labour-intensive operations such as in textiles, 
clothing and parts assembly; often it IS made by small enterprises and 
results in small scale foreign ventures; and involves joint-ventures 
partners In an important way3: such ventures tend to export a large 
share of their output. So Japanese OFI is export-oriented rather than 
domestic-market-oriented. American investment in contrast is often made 
in new industries and by firms which are the most successful in America; 
frequently involves very sophisticated technology and highly skilled 
labour; usually IS made by large enterprises from oligopolistic 
industries whose investments are in large scale ventures; and seldom 
involves joint-venture partners except in a minority status. These 
investments tend to concentrate on selling to the local market rather 
than exporting . 
(1) C.H. Lee (1979), 'Direct Foreign Investment', op.cit., p. 2. 
(2) L. Krause and S. Sekiguchi, 'Direct Forei gn Investment in Asean 
by Japan and the United States', Tenth Pacific Trade and Development 
Conference, A.N.U. 1979. pp. 24-27. 
(3) Ibid . , pp . 27-28. 
Also, Kojima assumes that there are great differences in the 
content of technology transfer and technology process and its effect, 
owing to the degree of development of industrial structure, between 
United States and Japan. His hypothesis suggests that there is a 
very small gap between Korean technology level (host country) and 
Japanese technology level (investing country) associated with DFI, 
13 
but a large gap between Korean technology level and American 
technology level associated with OFI. Japanese technology transferred 
to developing countries is not so much specific production techniques 
but rather knowhow or general industrial experiences involving not the 
latest but mature techniques . 
In contrast, the 'normative' side of the Kojima hypothesis is as 
follow: Kojima disputes the classical welfare analysis and believes 
only Japanese style DFI improves welfare. Kojima rests his analysis 
on whether international trade is promoted or retarted by the investment. 
Kojima's criterion for the evaluation of the various kinds of OFI 
is whether it is trade-oriented or anti-trade-oriented. He believes 
that a trade-oriented OFI helps the reorganization of the international 
division of labour and upgrades the industrial structure of both 
countries, whilst the anti-trade-oriented olle blocks the reorganization 
of international trade. Therefore, he expects the former to be more 
conducive to the welfare of the world than the latter. He argues that 
J FI . . I d 1 apanese 0 promotes lnternatlona tra e. 
Kojima argues that the United States has transferred abroad those 
industries which ranked at the top of her comparative advantage and 
has thus brought about balance of payment difficulties, unemployment 
and need for protection of remaining industries. American direct 
( 1) K. Kojima, 'Direct Foreign , . . .. , 1978. p.l00. 
investment 1S anti-trade biased Slnce it transfers advanced industries 
to other countries which replaces exports that could have been made 
from the United States. In other words, the transfer of technology 
is made too early in the product cycle Slnce econom1C rent was still 
being earned. Only when technology is fully standardized and readily 
available should it be transferred abroad though DFI as in the case 
of declining industries of Japan. The welfare of the United States 
is reduced becuase jobs are lost at home and the balance-of-payment 
1S forced into deficit. Both the loss of foreign markets and increase 
1n imports then results in balance of payments difficulties and the 
export of job opportunities. Furthermore the welfare of the host 
country cannot be improved very much since the investment does not 
match its factor endowment. Thus American investment is not in 
conformity with comparative advantage and thus cannot promote world 
welfare. 
In short,Krause and Sekiguchi tended to agree with the 'descriptive' 
part of Kojima hypothesis l . However, the claim that only Japanese 
investment improves welfare since it is trade-oriented as contrasted 
to United States anti-trade-oriented il1vestment is open to contention 
and requires critical assessment. Krause and Sekiguchi suggest that 
there should not be the presumption that Japanese investment is any 
more trade oriented and any more beneficial to welfare than American 
investment. 
There exists much disagreement with Kojima's hypothesis, but 
without further empirical investigation, no consensus can be reached. 
The present study does not attempt to carry out the empirical 
investigation of the 'normative' part from Kojima's hypothesis. Both 
international and time constraints prevented such an assignment. The 
objectives of this study are more limited. Some aspects of Kojima's 
hypothesis, the 'descriptive' part, is subject to further empirical 
inve'stig :ltlon here', p:lrtic1I1nr1y the ;lspect or tcchno1ogy tr;lI1Sr'Cr leve1 
of investing country. 
(1) L. Krause and S. Sekiguchi, 'Direct Foreign .... ', op.cit., p. 28 
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3. A MODEL OF TRADE-ORIENTED DFI AND A MODEL OF ANTI-TRADE-ORIENTED DFI 
The characteristics of two different methods or styles of DFI 
were identified in the previous section . Kojima characteri zed the 
Japanese type as 'trade-oriented', the American type as 'anti-trade-
oriented'. We explore the two different types of DFI by Kojima In 
theoretical terms in this section and followed by some critical assessments. 
(A) A Model of Trade-oriented Direct Investment (Japanese type DFI) 
Kojima constructs a model of comparative investment profitabilities for 
trade-oriented DFI in order to make clear the difference between the 
two types of foreign investment. The structure of comparative advantage 
before the OFI takes place resembles that shown in Table 2-l(a).1 
TABLE 2-1: A CASE OF TRADE ORIENTED DFI 
(a) Comparative Costs Before DFI 
Country A Country 
x goods (textiles) $100 $150 
Y goods (machines) $100 $300 
(b) Comparative Cost when DFI are taking 
place in Both Industries 
Country A Country B 
X goods $100 $ 75 
Y goods $100 $200 
B (c) Comparative Prifit Rates 
for Country ·A 
Domes- Invest- DFI 
tic ment 
X industry r 
x 
y industry r 
y 
10% r 1 13% 
xl 
10% r 5% 
y 
(el) Comparative Cos ts when DFr 
have t aken place only in 
X industry 
Country 
X goods $100 
Y goods $100 
A Country B 
$ 75 
$300 
Country A has a comparative advantage in Y industry and country B 
possesses a (potential) comparative advantage in X industry, or 
100 / 150 = 2 > 1, where C denotes production cost~ 
100 300 
This 
(1) K. Kojima, ' A Macroeconomic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment', 
Ilit otsubi.1Sh i .Jollrll i. li of Economics, .J lIllC, 1973, pp . 1- 21. 
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comparative advantage pattern results from the assumption that country A 
has a relative abundance of K 1n compar1son with country B (that is, 
KA > KB ) while X goods are more labour-intensive than Y goods in both 
LA LB 
countries, that 1S, KXA < KYA and KX B < KyB , as 1n the Heckscher-
-- --
LXA LYA LXB LYB 
Ohlin theorem. 
The new comparative costs that would result from direct investment 
1n both industries may be shown as in Table 2-l(b),in which production 
costs of both goods in country B are reduced in different degrees, 
strengthening comparative advantage in production of X. It is assumed 
that the degree of improvement in the production function is greater 
in X industry than in Y industry because the superior technology and 
management skill is more easily learned and there is a lesser requirement 
of skilled labour in the former industry. Thus, X goods produced in 
country B become competitive in international markets. 
The rate of profit from domestic investment in the X and Y 
industries, rand r respectively, is assumed to be the same, say 
x y 
10 per cent, in country A where free competition is said to prevail 
(Table 2-l(c). The rate of profit from DFI in country Bls X industry, 
1 . 1 
r , 1S, say, 13 per cent and would be higher than r because X 
x y 
industry 1n country B produces at lower cost than in the investing 
country and becomes competitive in international markets, thus 
increasing the profit margin. By contrast, Y industry in country B 
remains at a comparative disadvantage and uncompetitive in the 
international market, even if DFI is taking place, and DFI is relatively 
unprofitable compared with domestic investment, r , and DFI in X y 
. d 1 1n ustry, r In Table 2-l(c),the profit rate from DFI 1n country 
x 
Bl s Y industry is thus said to be 5 per cent. Obviously country A should 
be better off if it increased investment in Y industry at home and in X 
industry abroad. ll1is CCln be seen hy ex:amining (0) the absolute profit 
rate differential between home and DFI for each industry, or (b) 
comparative investment profitablities, that 1S, 
1 
r 
x / r 13 / 10 2.6 1 . x = = > 
-1 5 10 
r r y y 
In short, the core of Kojima's argument for trade-oriented DFI is 
that DFI should follow the direction indicated by comparative investment 
profitabilities, which in turn are a reflection of comparative 
advantage under competitive conditions. Thus, in the case of trade-
oriented DFI (Japanese type), DFI is not only complementary to trade 
but is also an accelerator in reorgan1s1ng trade patterns in the 
direction of comparative advantage. 
(B) 2 A Model of Anti-trade-oriented DFI (U.S. type DFI) 
Let us turn to examine DFI of the 'American or anti-trade-oriented' 
type. It is supposed that the pattern of comparative advantage between 
country P (U .S. ) and Country B is the same as in Table 2-2(a) and (b). 
TABLE 2-2 A CASE OF ANTI-TRADE-ORIENTED DFI 
(a) Comparative Costs Before DFI 
Country P Country B 
(c) Comparative Profit Rates for 
Country P 
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X goods $100 
Y goods $100 
$150 
$300 X industry 
Y industry 
Domestic Investmeyt DFI 
5% r 13% 
(b) Comparative Costs when DFI are 
taking place in both industries (d) 
Country P 
X goods $100 








10% r 33% 
X 
Comparative Costs when DFI are 
taking place only in the Y 
industry 







Even with such a pattern of comparative advantage, comparative profit 
rates for country P could be like those set out in Table 2-2(c). 
Kojima suggests three reasons for this. The first is the dualistic 
structure of the economy separating the new ollgopolistic s ector, Y, 
from the traditional competitive sector, X. The profit rate from 
domestic investment is not the same in the two sectors, but lower 1n 
(2) Kiyoshi Kojima, 'Direct Foreign Investment', 1977, op.cit., 
pp. 106-116. 
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the latter, say 5 per cent, than in the former, say 10 per cent. Second, 
since the X industry is assumed to operate under competitive conditions 
not only in the domestic market but throughout the world, OFI in this 
industry, if it takes place, is able to obtain the same profit rate, 
1 
r being 13 per cent, as country A's OFI. Third, the profit rate from 
x 
OFI ln Y industry, that is r 1, would be lower than in domestic investment y 
if the industry was competitive, but it is assumed to be 33 per cent, 
higher than in domestic investment and highest in the comparative 
profitabilities but without any relationship to comparative 
advantages. The reason is that technological advantage, product 
differentiation, superlor marketing, etc., create monopoly profits. 
In this case, the package of capital, technology and managerial skill 
brought in from country P to country B is not a general factor but 
a factor specific to that monopolistic firm. 
To take a specific case, Kojima supposes that country B levies 
a protective tariff as high as 200 per cent on the import of Y goods, 
thus allowing the high cost ($300) domestic producer to survive. 
It becomes profitable for industry Y from country P to invest in 
country B and sell from behind the tariff wall, rather than to export 
from country P. This foreign firm is able to produce Y at the cost 
of $200 and sell it at $300, leaving a mark-down ratio as high as 
33 per cent in terms of selling price. Now in the anti-trade-oriented 
type, OFI takes place in Y industry, a new oligopolistic industry and 
top in the rank of comparative advantage in order to realise that 
higher profit rate of 33 per cent from OFI than the 10 per cent 
obtainable from domestic investment. This has its rationale from 
private profit maximisation but not from a macro-economic point of Vlew. 
The contradiction between the comparative costs smwn in Table 2-2(b) 
and the comparative profit rates shown in Table 2-2(c) means that the 
market is not competitive but is disturbed by monopolistic or oligopolistic 
elements which briIlg about non-optimal use of resources ln each country 
and in tile world as a whole. A dUHlistic structure in country P between 
competitive and monopolistic sectors is exported throughout the world. 
When the OFI takes place in Y industry, the new comparative costs would 
be as shown in Table 2-2(d), so that the degree of comparative advantage 
of country pIS Y industry is reduced when compared to the original 
situation shown in Table 2-2(a). This makes export of Y goods from 
country P less profitable and smaller in amount. 
Further, if DFI is successful from the point of Vlew of the firm, 
production abroad becomes more profitable than in the investing 
country, resulting in a reversal of the direction of trade. This 
means that OrI of this type reverses the investing country's 
comparative advantage. 
Kojima ' s analysis is a sort of antithesis to the model developed 
by R.A. t41.mdell within a similar factor-endowments framework . 1 Mundell 
was the first to show the substitution ,' relationship between trade and 
factor movement . 
Kojima (1975 and 1977) glves his observation a theoretical 
underpinning by presenting a complements paradigm 6pposite to the 
Mundell substitutes paradigm; that is, with the inflow of capital 
the host country'sproduction frontier expands in such a direction that 
the less capital-intensive industry, for example that country's 
comparatively disadvantaged industry, contracts; the result is an 
enhancement of the basis for trade2 . 
He proceeds to argue that only OFI which is undertaken in the 
investing countrys comparative disadvantage industry complements 
3 
commodity trade and creates harmonious trade with the bost country. 
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Kojima concludes that the most important criterion ln undertaking 
OFI should be to take into consideration the present and potential 
pattern of comparative advantages betv.een investing and host countries and 
to undertake OFI from the investing country's comparative disadvantage 
(1) R.A. lW1dell, 'International trade and factor mobility', American 
Economic Review, vol, xlvii, no. 3 (June 1957), pp. 321-35. 
(2) K. Kojima 'Tntern~tion31 Trade 
Chokusetsutoshi i( on, op. ci t . 
, 
. .. , Ope cit., and Kaigai 
(3) We do not intend to link this kind of normative argument from 
Kojima's hypothesis to our study. 
2U 
between invcsting and host countries and to undertake DFI from the 
investing country's comparative disadvantage industry~. Kojima 
emphasizes that trade-creating DFI is feasible only when it is undertaken 
in an industry in which the host country has a comparative advantage. 
The ' factor-endowments ' analytical approach of Kojima seems to offer 
help in understanding the distinct features of Japan's overseas 
investment. However, it is open to a number of criticisms. 
Some critical V1ews of Kojima's two different types of model 
could be stated briefly. 
(1) First of all, the terminology of trade-oriented DFI and 
anti-tradc-oriented DFI is conceptually ambiguous. 
Kojima's hypothesis deals only with what may be called the impact 
effect on trade of DFI--the effect on the comparative advantages of the 
countries involved--and thus on their static patterns of trade. 
It 1S essentially a partial and static analysis and that does not 
fit the dynamics of DFI. 
(2) Kojima's criterion for the evaluation of the var10US kinds of 
DFI 1S whether it is trade-oriented or anti-trade oriented. He believes 
that a trade-oriented foreign direct investment helps the reorganization 
of the international division of labour and upgrades the industrial 
structure of both countries, whilst the anti-trade-oriented one blocks 
the reorganization of international trade. Therefore, he expects the 
former to be more conductive to the welfare of the world than the latter. 
The welfare ga1ns to Japan of Japanese DFI(labour-oriented DFI) are clear 
enough, but what do host countries gain from it? 
Kojima did not emphasize the welfare criteria from the point of 
V1ew of the recipient; developing countries Kojima introduced illustrate 
exalllples of his tl'Llue-oriclltcd and anti-traJe orientcd types only from 
the point of view of the investing country. In this aspect 
(1) K. KojimLJ, 'Direct ... ', 1979. op.cit ., p. 131. 
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1 Arndt suggested 'the other welfare criteria' such as 'direct, 
indirect (spillover) development effect', which is of chief importance 
to the host country. A valuable comment by Arndt is as follows: How 
much benefit 'labour-oriented' OFI confers on the host country depends 
on its direct and indirect (spill-over) developmental effects. The effects 
may be thought very favourable, even if such investment is for some 
time 'illlti-trade-oriented', provided it contributes substantially not 
only to employment but also to developing local entrepreneurship, 
managerial and technical skills and through backward and forward 
linkages generates other important economies. Conversely, 'labour-
oriented' OFI may be of very little benefit to the host country if, 
as in the case of the bond-processing 'off-shore' type, its developmental 
effects are virtually confined to employment of labour. In Korea, 
particularly textiles are electronic industries where Japanese 
manufacturing investment is export-oriented, it lS almost entirely 
dependent on the Japanese export market and much of it consists of 
bond-processing off shore production, which, in its nature has few 
beneficial spill-over effects . 
(3) Kojima describes United States OFI, the oligoloplistic market 
oriented OFI in terms of Vernon's product-cycle theory, in contrast to 
the cheap labour type OFI, which is against the structure of comparative 
advantage. A question raised by Arndt is worthwhile noting here again2 . 
Does new product of oligopolistic stage necessarily cut off the 
investing country's own comparative advantage? The process by which 
international transmission of technology, whether through OFI or 
through imitation by local jnvestors jn forei gn countries, undermines 
the initial comparative advantage of the leading industrial country 
is not peculiar to the 'oligopolistic' product-style case. It was 
the same process that led to the United States and European countries 
losing~lerr earlier comparative advantage in textiles and other li ght 
consumer goods production first to Japan, later to Korea, Hong Kon g 
(1) II. W. Arndt, 'Professor Koj ima on the Macro economics of Forei gn 
Oirect Investment ' , IIitotsubashi Journal of Economics , June 1973. 
(2) 11.W. Arndt, ' Professor Kojima on the lacrocconomic s ...... ,' 
op .cit ., p. 33. 
and later other low-wage less developed countries, due primarily to 
rising productivity and real wages. Kojima regards the 
oligopolistic-market oriented DFI (United States DFI) as contrary to 
the structure of comparative advantage because the industries which it 
establishes in the host countries tend to be unsuitable to their 
factor proportions. 
It is true, of course, that investment 1n such capital-and-
technology-intensive industries tends to have few favourable spillover 
effects on employment and dev~lopment 1n LDC. Conversely, American 
style DFI with its new product technology and advanced management 
methods, may make a unique and significant contribution to the 
welfare of a host country with spread effects throughout the economy. 
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As K and S pointed out l , Kojima is seriously wrong in estimating host 
country welfare gain from United States DFI. His mis-match with factor-
endowment analysis overlooks the uncertainty of causation between 
the variables, an uncertainty that grew out of Leontief's work on 
the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. Do factor availabilities determine 
export structure or do export ventures create their own factors 
through trainings? Anyway, it is cle"ar enough that the Kojima 
analysis is most deficient with respect to American DFI. 
(4) Is the monopolistic theory of United States type DFI completely 
irrelevant to the behaviour of Japanese type DFI? True, some Japanese 
industrial are now characterized by oligopolistic rivalry, and some 
individual firms have attained a scale of operations that is large 
by international standards, large enough to form a technostructure. 
In this respect, the argument of Kojima's emphasising the salient 
differences between United States type DFI and Japanese type DFI is 
losing its persuasiveness . The number of large-scale firms has increased 
rapidly and will no doubt rise in the future. Japan's eoonomy 1S 
grow1ng and changing so rapidly that her own DFI is already in part 
of oligopoJistic type OFT, [lnti-trndc-orientccl type [lncl i s like ly to 
resemble the United States type increasingly in the year to come and 
hl:Jving the dUl:J1istic structure of the economy separating the new 
(1) L. Krause and S . Sekiguchi, op.cit., p. 30. 
oligopolistic sector from the trad~tional competitive sector. Stephen 
Hymer in one of the passages quoted by Kojima speaks of the challenge 
of Japanese as well as European firms to American corporations, first 
In competition, then in 'collusion as dominant firms of the center 
1 present a united front' to the third world. Arndt argues that 
we need not follow the flights of Hymer's imagination to realise that 
the special features of Japanese OFI which Kojima stresses may 
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themselves be a passing phase, as the home base of Japanese manufacturing 
shifts rapidly towards advanced technology-intensive industry. 
4. SCOPE AND FRAMEWORK OF THIS STUDY: KOJIMA'S HYPOTHESIS 
(1) Kojima uses Purvis' definition2 (1972) of trade-oriented and 
anti-trade oriented investment. Accordingly, DFI is trade-oriented 
if it generates an excess demand for imports and excess supply of 
exportables at constant terms of trade, and it is anti-oriented if the 
converse holds, and he refers to two different types of DFI: trade-oriented 
(the Japanese type) and anti-trade-oriented (the American type). 
However, as Lee (1979) pointed out3 , the long-run effect on the 
pattern of trade of DFI, indicates the ambiguity of Kojima's term 
'trade-ori ented '. Koj.ima' s hypothesis deal only wi th 'vI/hat may be 
called the impact effect on trade, of DFI--the effect on the 
comparative advantages of the countries involved-- and thus on static 
patterns of trade. It lS essentially a partial and static analysis 
that does not fit the dynamics of OFI. One would also expect OFI to 
change the growth rate of the host country's economy and thus to have a 
long-run dynamic effect on its pattern of trade. If United States 
OFI with anti-trade-oriented impact effect is more growth-promoting 
than Japanese OFI with trade-oriented impact effect and if trade is 
heavily associated with growth (like Korea), it is conceivable that the 
net effect of United States OFI is more trade-oriented than that of 
Japanese OFI . American type investment may even be more trade promoting 
than Japanese, indeed if the second-round growth effects are included 
(1) H.W. Arndt, 'Pro fessor ... . ,' op.cit., p. 34. 
(2) D.O. Purvis , ' Technology, Trade and Factor Mobility, I Economic 
J ourl1 ~~_ , September, 1972 pp. 991-999. 
(3) L.H. Lee (1979), op.cit., pp. 31-33. 
1n the analysis. Therefore, how can Kojima claim that Japanese type 
OFI alone is trade-oriented and improves welfare, as compared with 
United States OFI? 
Again, a simple question 1S raised: 1S Japanese OFI trade-
oriented and United States OFI is anti-trade-oriented? We do not 
2£1 
know the answer. As far as the analysis of this question is concerned, 
without specifying the long-run dynamic effect, we can not therefore 
designate any given OFI as either trade-oriented or anti-trade-oriented. 
In order to avoid possible confusion due to ambiguity of terminology, 
export-oriented and domestic-market-oriented are ,used 1n this study 
instead of using trade-oriented and anti-trade-oriented respectively. 
The terminology of export-oriented and domestic-market-oriented has the 
advantage of referring to the more immediate effect of OFI with there 
being no inference about its long run dynamic effect. The terminology 
of export-oriented and domestic-market-oriented avoids the pitfall 
of conceptual ambiguity. It seems more sensible to confine the 
analysis to the impact effect of OFI until the longer run effects 
can be considered more vigourously. Another important advantage 
of using the proposed terminology is that it is compatible with the 
procedure adopted by the Korean Government for gathering data on 
OFI1. 
The study evaluates Kojima's hypothesis in the sense of 
determining whether American OFI is domestic-market-oriented and 
Japanese OFI export-oriented. The aim is to compare the market-
orientation -- export-oriented or domestic-market-oriented -- of the 
United States and Japanese OFI 1n Korea. An empirical survey test 
of this aspect of Kojima's hypothesis will be attempted in the 
next chapter. In additioIl, it is interesting to ask whether Americnn 
OFI is carried out mainly by larger oligopolistic firms and examining 
whether American O~I by the large oligopolistic firms is the relatively 
large investment amount per project than American non-major firms anJ 
(1) Since it requests fo rei gn investors to state the share of their 
outputs destined for an export market, government statistics 
report only the relative shares of outputs for an export and 
o domestic market ~lnd thus the jmpact effect of OFT . 
also whether the same holus true for Japanese DFI. The s tuuy is 
thus concerned with the desctiptive part of Kojima's hypothesis. 
(2) We compare the market-orientation -- export-oriented or 
domestic-market-oriented -- of American and Japanese OFI in Chapter 3-1. 
A simple and important question is raised: what accounts for the 
difference in the market-orientation of United States and Japanese OFI? 
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Why do United States and Japanese firms choose different market-orientat·ion 
(export-oriented OFI OT domestic-market-oriented OFI) if they face 
the same investment environment in Korea. 
In order to llilswcr this question, it IS worthwhile noting the 
difference In motivating factors between United States and Japanese OFI 
in Korea. First of all, we review briefly various studies of foreign 
investment motivation, especially whether it is for domestic-market-oriented 
OFI and export-oriented OFI [Brash (1966), FKI (1968), Y.S. Chang (1971), 
Allen (1973), Korean University Team (1974), Chi (1975), Riedel (1975), 
Chung (1976), EPB (1980)]. 
Then, in order to explain the difference in this market-orientation 
between United States and Japan, we develop the hypothesis that the 
motivating factors for American OFI in Korea were non-marketable, 
firm-specific advantages in production, management and marketing 
techniques whereas a motivating factor for Japanese OFI In Korea was 
a non-marketable, firm-and-location specific advantage In marketing 
technique and not in production technology and management. 
Consider the varIOUS studies of foreign investment motivation 
briefly. 
For domestic-market oriented OFI, the most important factor is, 
according to BrClsh (1966)1, the demanl condition in the host country 
representeJ by such variables as the size of a domestic market and its 
(1) O.T. Brash, 'American Investment in Australian Industry', Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1966. 
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growth rate. According to the report of Riedel (1975)1, who carried 
out research on DFI in Taiwan , the most important factor for export-oriented 
DFI is the availability of relatively inexpensive labour 1n the host 
country . According to the report of an early sample survey on foreign 
investment climate and motives conducted by the Federation of Korean 
2 Industry (FKI) (1968) , the main motive of more than half of the ninety 
firms covered in the survey was stated as taking advantage of expected 
growth in Korea's local markets. 
A study by S . S. Chang3 emphasizes that labour cost 1S the most 
obvious and important reason for selecting a particular location, 
According to Allen's4 stucly (1973), for American type OrI, motives 
underlying equity investment of United States firms in Korea are the 
securing, maintaining and deve l oping of the Korean domestic maiket which 
would otherwise be lost to the company. According to a Korean 
Development Institute (KDI)5 (1974) survey on joint-venture firms, 
the main motive on the part of a Korea partner for going into joint 
ventures with foreign partners was found to be closely related to 
overseas export marketing. Chi (1975) asked a 
(1) J. Riedel, ' The Nature and Determinants of Export-oriented Direct 
Foreign Investment in a Developing country: A case study of Taiwan, ' 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiw, 1975, Band III, Heft.3, pp. 505-526. 
(2) Division of International Co-operation, the Federation of Korean 
Industries (FKI), ' Incentives and Obstacles to Foreign Investment 
in Korea,' (in Korean), Seoul, 1968. 
(3) Y. S . Chang, 'Economies of Off-shore Assembly,' The Case of the 
Semi-conductor Industry, 1971. 
(4) Allen (1972),'Direct Investment of United States enterprises 
in Southeast Asia,' no. 2. pp. 14-17. 
(5) C.K. Park, 'A study of the joint-venture Investment in Korea,' 
a research paper presented at the KDI-HIID conference; seoul, 
June, 1974. 
(6) C. Chi, 'Direct Foreign Investment in Korea,' Seoul, 1975, pp. 33-38. 
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sample of Uniteu States and Japanese firms operating 1n Korea to 
rank various motives for investing in Korea. For both the United States 
and Japanese firms the most important factor was the availability of 
relatively inexpensive labor. Chung l (1976) found the incentives offered 
by the Korean Government to be of primary iltlportance for investing 
K I d db K U
" 2 ln orea. n contrast, a survey con ucte y a orean n1vers1ty team 
(1974) gives a clear-cut indication of reversal 1n priority in the 
majority of the firms covered, more than one third of the 135 firms 
covered in the survey stated that their top-most motive was to take 
advantage of favourable labour supply, namely, low wages for unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers. 
According to the Korean Government's recent survey on the 
operations of foreign-firms 3 the top-most motive among motivating 
factors in Korea is to secure the low-cost and high quality labour. 
In conclusion, one can note a gradual shift in emphasis over 
time from the penetration of the well-protected and fast-growing local 
markets to the attractiveness of cheap labour, as the main motive on 
the past of foreign investors 1n Korea. Between 1968 and 1974, 
there was a clear-cut shift in motive for foreign private investment 
in Korea from the import-substituting, local-market oriented type to 
the labour-intensive, export-market-oriented type. However, these 
studies do not explain the difference in motivating factors between 
United States and Japanese DFI and these studies indicate that in terms 
of the motives for investing in Korea there is almost no consistent 
difference between united States DFI and Japanese DFI. This result 
may possibly be due to sampling biases. It should be pointed out, 
4 however, as Lee (1979) has, that whatever the results of such 
(1) B. S. Chung, ' The Choi ce of Product i on Techniques by Unj ted States 
;111l1 ,);lp;llll'SC Sl1hsidi~lries in Korc~l,' ~lJl unpub1i s hed ph.IL thCSLS, 
University of Hawaii, 1976. 
(2) S.H. Jo, 'Direct Foreign Private Investment in South Korea: A 
f: co 11 0 III i c S II TV e y " 1 9 7 7. K 111, a \ v 0 r k i. n g p ~ p e y . 
(3) EPB, 'Economic Analysis .... ,' 19 80 , op.cit., p. 28 . 
(4) C.H. Lee (1979), op,cit., p . 7-9. 
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surveys may b~ they can not answer the question why United States 
OFI in Korea is domestic-market-oriented: In other words, why did 
United States and Japanese firms choose different market-orientation if 
they faced the same investment environment prevailing in Korea? 
The answer to this question 1S to be formed not in the conditions that 
prevailed in Korea and thus attracted these firms to invest there, but 
in the factors th8t are specific to the firms making investment decisions. 
The firm possesses a specific advantage 1n production technology, 
management and marketing, and therefore will have an incentive to 
extend its use through DFI once it has acquired the advantage and thus 
to increase the quasi-rent . Thus, the essential charasteristics of such 
an advantage are its non-marketability and firm-specificity~ 
Therefore, domestic-oriented orI (United States type OFI) in Korea, 
1n order to exploit its non-marketable, firm-specific advantages 1n 
production technology, management and marketing, might be explained by 
the monopolistic theory of OFI. It is found that the accepted theory of 
OFI (monopolistic theory of OFI) 1S not enough to explain the 
Japanese OFr in Korea. 111at is why we establish the hypothesis that 
motivating factors for United States in Korea were non-marketable, 
firm-specific advantages in production management and marketing 
technique whereas a motivating factor for Japanese OFI in Korea was 
a non-marketing technique and not in production technology and management. 
It is worthwhile noting the fact that motivating factors of 
American OFI may be explained by the monopolistic theory of OFI. In 
short, in Chapter 3-2, the study analyse the difference in the motivating 
factors between United States and Japanese OFI in Korea and try to 
explore the question why Unj ted Stat es and J apanes e firms chose 
different nlarket-orientation if they faced the same investment 
environment prevailing in Korea. 
(1) We try to fit the auove different market-orientation between 
United States OFI and Japanese OFI into the monopolistic 
theory of OFI. 
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(3) In Chapter 3-3, we provide some evidence to support the hypothesis 
that motivating factors of United States DFI in Korea were non-marketable, 
firm-specific advantages in production technology, management and 
marketing techniques whereas a motivating factor for Japanese DFI 
in Korea was a non-marketable, firm-and-10cation-specific advantage In 
marketing technique and not In production and management. 
One of the corollaries of the hypothesis that a firm makes DFI 
In order to exploit its non-marketable, firm-specific advantage In 
production technology, management and marketing is, as pointed out by 
Kindleberger (1969)1 that the firm will want to maintain the controls 
of its foreign operation with its foreign partners and will thus 
prefer 100 per cent ownerships to joint-ventures or minority 
holdings 2 . The reason for this predilection for control is the firm '·s 
desire to retain its special advantage and thus the rent from the 
advantage, since the loss of control will entail sharing the advantage 
and the rent with local partners in the short run and probably a 
complete appropriation of the advantage in the long run. As no direct 
observation on the firm's possession of the advantage yet exists, a 
test of the hypothesis may be made indirectly by carrying out an 
empirical verification of the corollary. 
Another one of the corollaries of the hypothesis that a firm makes 
DFI in order to exploit its non-marketable, firm-specific advantage in 
production technology, management and marketing is that the firm will 
want to maintain the control of its foreign operation with its foreign 
3 partners and will thus prefer patent system We assume that major 
(1) C.P . Kindleberger, 'American Business Abroad,' Yale University, Press, 
New Haven, 1969. 
(2) rOY eX;1mple, ;1 l;1yge J\meriC;1n suhsidiary in the petrochemic(ll 
field establishes overseas manufacturing affiliates where their 
technology has a competitive advantage over local products and/or 
processing techniques. They prefer direct investment and full 
subsidiary control in order to fully exploit their product Line. 
(3) Constantine Vaitsos, 'Patents Revisted: Their Function in 
Developing Countries' in Cooper, 'Science, Technology and 
Development,' pp. 71-72. 
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United States corporations use patents as powerful strategic weapons 
to achieve their monopolistic gains, and for this reason, the most 
advanced technologies are registered as patents. The reason for this 
predilection for control 1S the firm's desire to ga1n its special 
firm-specific advantages in production technology. As pointed out by 
Vaitsos (1973)1, patent holding firms can control production and the 
patent system enables them to use patents as source of monopolistic gains. 
We try to provide some reliable evidence to support the hypothesis such 
as the tendency of 100 per cent ownership preference by large, 
oligopolistic American firms for the first corollary and high ratio of 
patent holding by large, oligopolistic American firms for the second 
2 
corollary . 
(4) We have focused the difference market-orientation and examined 
motivating factors behind the difference between American DFI and 
Japanese DFI. So far, we develop different hypotheses for United 
States and Japanese DFI and suggest two different corollaries to prove 
the hypothesis for United States DFI. The present study continue to 
cover the aspect of technology transfer level of Kojima's hypothesis, 
establishing another hypothesis concerning transfer of technology. 
This hypothesis is as follows: According to Kojima's hypothesis, owing 
to the degree of cJevelopment of inuustrial structure, he assumes that 
there are great differences in the content of technology transfer and 
technology process and its effect. lie assumes that the smaller the 
technological difference between the investing and host country industry 
is, the easier it is to transfer and improve the technology in the latter. 
(1) Ibid., p. 74. 
(2) For example, Texas Instruments prefers to utilize its patents and 
knowhow overseas through whOlly-owned subsidiaries. They believe 
that in the fact moving electronics industry, maximum profit 
from new technological advances can best be realized through 
close proprietary control, which maximizes penetration in 
overseas markets and provides opportunities for cross-fertilization 
of ideas. 
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In other words, his hypothesis suggests that there is a very small gap 
between Korean technology level and Japanese technology level by DFI 
relatively, but a large gap between Korean technology level and American 
technology level by DFI (we put this Kojima's hypothesis as hypothesis 
I I I) . 
In short, he assumes United States technology level of transfer 
lS higher than that of Japan. Kojima's argument that the relatively 
small technological gap between J8pan and the developing countries 
constitutes an advantage for Japan to invest in the latter lS an 
interesting approach as it is a view quite opposite to the requirement 
of ' advantage ' emphasized in the monopolistic theory of DFI: the 
larger the technological difference between the investing and host 
country industry, the easier and the more profitable to make overseas 
. 1 lnvestment . 
The present study alms to provide some evidence to support the 
validity of this hypothesis and the empirical case study of machinery 
industry ln Korem1 manufacturing industries will be presented as a way 
of checking the validity of the hypothesis and the implications of the 
finding of the test will be examined with careful perspectives. We use 
SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) technique to prove 
the hypothesis ln Chapter 4. 
(5) In the last Chapter 5, we sum up all prevlous propositions from 
Kojima's work, and their implications to Korean economy, tiding 
up to link the points of difference in market-orientation, motivation 
factors, technology transfer level between United States firms and 
Japanese firms associated with DFI in Korea. 
(1) T. Ozawa, 'International Investment and Industrial Structure: 
ew Theoretical Implication from the Japanese Experience,' 
Oxford Economic paper, 1979. March, pp. 80-83 . 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE LITERATURE AND EVIDENCE OF KOJI~W8 HYPOTHESIS 
In this Chapter, a summary of the literature and evidence of 
descriptive part of Kojima's hypothesis will be presented and evaluated. 
We introduce and evaluate several aspects from the Kojima's work and 
explore whether those findings are applicable to Korea or not. 
In section 1, we compare and provide evidence about the market-
orientation - export-oriented or domestic-market-oriented - of United 
States and Japanese DFI in Korea and other salient features of the 
descriptive part of Kojima's hypothesis. Section 2 analyses the 
difference in the factors motivating United States and Japanese DFI In 
Korea and attemp~ to answer the question why did United States and 
Japanese choose different market-orientation when they faced the same 
investment environment in Korea. Section 3 provides some evidence to 
support the hypothesis that factors motivating United States DFI in Korea 
were non-marketable, firm-specific advantages in production management 
and marketing techniques whereas a factor motivating for Japanese DFI in 
Korea was a non-marketable, firm-and-Iocation specific advan't age in 
marketing technique and not in production and management. The study 
continues to find out some of the factors that would have to be taken 
into account beyond that factor. 
I MARKET-ORIENTATION 
Is the United States DFI domestic-market-ori ented wllile that 
of the Japanese export-oriented (hypothesis I)? 
As one expects, the output from a glven investment project is 
seldom solely for an export or domestic market. Since in most cases the 
output is produced for both markets, most investment projects are neither 
entirely export-oriented nor entirely domestic-market-oriented. We avoid 
nn oversimplification or a sweeping dicllotomy to he interpreted as 
implying that all Japanese DFI is of the one kind, and all American 
investment of the other. However, in order to compare the overall 
market-orientation of United States and Japanese DFI in Korea, the 
following simplifying assumption is made: An investment project is 
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export -oriented if at least 50 per cent of its output is to be exported 
and it is domestic-marke t -oriented if less than 50 per cent of its output 
is to be exported. The following Table 3-1 from Lee (1979)1 compares the 
overall market-orientation of United States and Japanese DFI in Korea and 
reveals that 88 . 7 per cent of United States DFI in Korea is domestic-
market-oriented and only 11.3 per cent export-oriented, whereas 39 per 
cent of Japanese DFI in Korea is domestic-market-oriented and 61 per cent 
export-oriented . Therefore, United States DFI in Korea may be labelled 
domestic-market-oriented both absolutely and relatively with respect · to 
Japanese DFI in Korea. 
TABLE 3-1 UNITED STATES INVESMENT IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (1962-74) 
(on arrival basis) 
No . Total Average Market-orientation 
Industry of Amount Amount Domestic Export 
Project Invested Invested 
Food and Live 9 $2134.3 $ 237.1 $ 941.9 $ 1192.4 
animals (44%) (56%) 
Beverage and Tobacco 2 1629 815.5 1629 0 
(100%) (0%) 
Petroleum and Pet 4 43830 10957 . 5 43830 0 
Products (100%) (0%) 
Chemicals 14 34584 2470.3 34149 435 
(99%) (1%) 
Textile Yarn, Fabric 9 3995.2 433.9 2880 1115.2 
Made-up articles (172%) (28%) 
and Related Products 
Manufactures of metal 4 1330 332.5 50 1280 
and non-metal ( 4%) (96%) 
mi118rals 
Machinery and Tran 15 29525.4 1968.4 28459 1066.4 
Equip . (96%) (47%) 
Electric and 20 12583 629.2 3277 9306 
Electronic Equip. (26%) (74 %) 
Misc . Manufactured 7 1413 201.9 1017 396 
Articles (72%) (28 %) 
Total 84 131023.9 1559.8 116232.9 14791 
(88.7%) (11.3%) 
Source: .ErB , ROK, ' The Current State of foreign Investment'. 1975 
(1) C. II. Lee (1979), 'Direct ... ' op.ut., p.3 
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Exceptions to this general pattern are found in certain industries. 
As seen in Table 3-1, United States OFI in the manufacturing of metal and 
non-metal minerals, food and live animals, and electric and electronic 
equipment is heavily export-oriented. The total amount of investment In 
these industries is, however, only ten per cent of the total United 
States OFI in Korea, having only a slight effect on the overall market-
orientation. However it probably may have had a greater effect on the 
overall export-orientation patterns if we take into account the period 
1975-79 due to the emphasis the Korean Government's export policy on 
electric and electronic equipment during that period. 
Table 3-2 shows nIne industries in which Japanese OFI was made. 
A major portion of the investment in eight of the nine industries is 
export-oriented. The exception is in chemicals: the amount invested In 
this industry, however, accounts for only 11.6 per cent of the total 
Japanese OFI in Korea. As far as the data concerned, the Lee (1979) 
study has significant evidence to support the hypothesis I that United 
States OFI is domestic-market and Japanese OFI is export-oriented1 . 
Kojima argues that United States OFI is carried out by large 
oligopolistic firms. Is United States OFI carried out by large multi-
national enterprises in Korea? As a way of checking the validity of his 
argument, Lee (1979) examined the list of United States firms that had 
invested in Korea against the list of the top 500 corporations 
published in Fortune (May 1977)2. The names of 29 corporations were 
fow1d on both lists and the combined investment by these firms was 
found to account for 73 per cent of the total United States OFI In 
Korea. This finding may be wrong due to small sampling biases. 
Therefore, we want to check the validity of Kojima's argument 
(1) C.H. Lee (1979) included the services industry, however, to test 
Kojima's hypothesis, we omitted the service industry because the 
Kojima hypothesis should only be reltlted to ll1tlnuftlcturing investment. 
(2) Large firms that have invested in Korea do fit into the description 
of the conventionally defined oligopolistic firms, even though there 
is a doubt that l arge firms are not necessarily oligopolistic 
firms. 
TABLE 3-2 JAPANESE DFI IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (1962-74)* 
(on arrival basis) 
3S 
No . Total Average Market-orientation 
Industry of Amount Amount Domestic Export 
Project Invested Invested 
Food and Live 37 $5035.7 $ 136.1 $1207 ·$3828.7 
animals (24%) (76%) 
Crude Fertilizers 7 995 . 8 142.7 0 995.8 
and Crude Minerals (100%) 
Chemicals 64 28772.9 449.6 19157 9615.9 
(67%) (33%) 
Wood and Cork 3 579.5 193.2 0 579.5 
Manufactures (0%) (100%) 
Textile Yarn Fabric, 66 125648.9 1903.8 45019 80629.9 
Made up Articles (36%) (64%) 
and Related Product 
Manufactures of 62 26317.6 425.5 12160 14157.6 
Metal and non-Metal ( 46%) (54%) 
Minerals 
Machinery and Trans . 60 13978.5 233 5548 8430.5 
Equipment ( 40%) (60%) 
Electric and 122 35241 288.9 1204 34037 
Electronic Equip. (3%) (97%) 
Misc. Manufactured 91 11510.8 126.5 848 10662.8 
Articles (7%) (93%) 
Total 512 248080.7 484.5 805143 162937.7 
(39%) (61%) 
Source: EPB, 'The Current State of Foreign Investment' , 1975. 
with more samples and longer period. The 145 United States firms that 
had invested in Korea during 1962-78.6 was checked against the list of 
the top 500 corporations published in Fortune (August 1979).1 The names 
of 79 firms were found on both lists and these firms were found to 
(1) 145 firms covers the whole four main United States investment 
industries, which is composed at 73 per cent from all United 
States firms in Korea. 
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account for 54.5 per cent of 145 United States firms in Korea. 1 Another 
way of checking the validity of the hypothesis is presented in Table 3-3. 
This table shows investment by industry and market-orientation. The 
investment in Korea by these large corporations is overwhelmingly 
domestic-market-oriented with only two per cent being export-oriented. 
TABLE 3-3 DIRECT INVESTMENT IN KOREA BY MAJOR UNITED STATES 
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Source: EPB, ROK, 'The current state of Foreign Investment: 1975. 
(1) Criteria year: August 1979 Fortune 
Summary of Finding No. of firms Oligopolistic firms % 
Petroleum nnd Chem- 43 23 54 Industry 
Metal Industry 17 10 59 
Electric and Electronic 40 20 50 
equipment 
General Machinery 45 26 58 
Total 145 (73%) 79 Average 54.5% 
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Table 3-4 shows DFI in Korea by United States not on the list of 
Fortune's 500. Their investment lS not as domestic-market-oriented as 
that of those firms on the list: 69 per cent for domestic market and 
31 per cent for export markets as compared with 98 per cent and two per 
cent for the respective markets . Nonetheless it is more domestic-
market-oriented than Japanese DFI in Korea. 
TARLE 3-4 DFI IN KOREA BY NON-MAJOR UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS (1962-74) 




































































( 43%) (57%) 
22010.9 12576 
(69%) (31%) 
Source: EPB ROK, 'The current state of Foreign Investment' , 1975. , 
Besides the difference in market-orientation, an additional 
ci10ractcrjstic or OFI by the large oligopoli. s tjc [inns is til l' l' l' l ;lli vely 
large amount that tlley invest per project. The average amount invested 
by these firms ,.,,:1S US$3.8 million ,."here:1s the aveY:1ge :1mount invested by 
the smaller United States firms was US$0.6 million. The latter is 
slightly larger than the average for Japanese DFI in Korea, US$0.5 
million, according to Lee (1979) study. Another confirmation of this 
1S the finding that the average amount invested by United States DFI 
firms (including non-major firms) during 1962-1978.6 was US$ 2.033 
million whereas the average amount invested by the Japanese DFI in 
Korea was US$ 1.07 million. It is very interesting to notice that the 
average amount invested by the Japanese DFI increased from US$ 0.5 
million during 1962-74 to US$ 1.07 million during 1962-78.6. For more 
details, see the Table 3-5. 
From Table 3-5, for United States DFI, 16 firms (out of a total 
of 67) invested more than US$ 1 . 0 million each and accounted for 89.1 
per cent of that country's total DFI in manufacturing industry. The 
corespondil1g 61 Japanese firms (out of a total of 414) which invested 
more than US$ 1 . 0 million, composed only 4.2 per cent. 
In short, small investment DFI in Korea was dominated by the 
Japanese. The proportion of firQs which invested less than US$ 0.2 
million for example, rates 49.5 per cent as against only 32 per cent 
of United States firms. 
2. MOTIVATING FACTORS 
In the previous section, it was shown that United States DFI 1n 
Korea is generally domestic-market-oriented (which the emphasis of 
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large oligopolistic firms) relatively to Japanese DFI in Korea. This 
finding is consistent with Kojima's observation stated earlier in the 
paper. Other findings on features of orr in Korea are also consistent 
with the descriptive part of Kojima's hypothesis. However, what accounts 
for the difference in their market-orientation? This important question 
is still unexplained. 
Now, we will try to reVIew the prevlous stuuies of foreign 
investment motivation. They might be useful in explaining the difference 
in their market-orientation between United StCltes Clnd Japanese DFI. 
(1) One of interpretations of this finding is that the size of 
invC'stment for cach projcct might contribute to the different 
pattern of ownership between United States and Japan. Given the 
relatively small sums involved in Japanese investment, it would 
not hClve been difficult for Korean partners to acquire a majority 
ownership. 
TABLE 3-5 I\\1:STMENT OUTLI:-JE BY COUNTRY BY SIZE AMOUNT IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (1980) (on arrival basis) 
Less Less Less More Total Slze 
of than 0.2 million than 1 . 0 million than 5 . 0 million than 5.0 million 
.unt . No . of Amount % A B C A B C A B I 
C A I B I C 
I I 
I i 
Country ProjAct B C : I I I 
I I I 
I 
1 I 
America 22 1640 1. 1 29 i 14173 9 . 8 10 22499 15.4 6 187397 I 73.7 67 I 145708 100 
I I I I I 
!Japan 205 18864 5.7 148 166898 120. 1 50 102985 31.0 11 1143628 ! 43 . 2 414 332375 100 
, J 
19 1 11216 
I 
122423 I 100 Others 11 1353 1 . 1 9 . 2 10 21157 17.3 5 I 88697 , 72.4 45 
I 
, 
I I i· ; I I 





Total 238 21857 3.6 196 92287 15.4 70 146641 24.4 22 1339772 I 56.6 600507 100 I . I 




First, it is of importance to compare the findings here with the 
results of the study of Allen (1973)1. According to Allen, there are 
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two major motivations in American OFI in a country such as Korea. Those 
motives have equal weight and are: (i) the securing, maintaining and/or 
developing of an overseas market which would otherwis e be lost to the 
country, (ii) the competitive forces in the home and international market 
necessitating the development of overseas low-cost bases for - export 
back to the home country, and - export to a third country. Even though, 
Allen did not examine the motivation for OFI industry by industry 1n 
Korea, it can easily be assumed th~lt the first mot i ve which coulJ be 
generally applied for United States OFI is domestic-market-oriented, 
as Kojima pointed out. Similarly, according to Brash (1966),2 the most 
important factor for domestic-market-oriented OFI 1S the demand condition 
in the host country represented by such variables as the size of a 
domestic market and its growth rate. 
llowever, it should be pointed out that an industry-by-industry 
bias is also apparent for United States OFI in Korea. That is, United 
States DPI in the electric and electronic equipment industry 1S heavily 
export-oriented in the same way as the Japanese OFI in these sectors and 
thus falls within the second motivational category identified by Allen. 
According to Riedel (1975)3, who carried out research on OFI in 
Taiwan, the most important motivating factor for export-oriented DFI is 
the availability of relatively inexpensive labour in the host country. 
Korea as well as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are the most important 
as locations for lowest export-oriented production, especially for 
electric and electronic goods which account for the bulk of investment 
projects in these countries. 
(1) Allen (1973), op.cit., 
(2) Br;Jsh (1966), op.cit., 
(3) Riedel (1975),op . cit., 
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1 A study by Y.S . Chang (1971) of the economlCS of off-shore seml-
conductor assembly of United States companies reveals that although the 
threat of foreign compet itors is most often the publicly stated reason 
for off-shore activities, the desire to be the leader ln cost reduction 
seems to be the most important and immediate reason. He also found that 
labour cost is the most obvious and important reason for selecting a 
particular location. 
Several s tudies have been recently completed dealing with the 
motives for investment in Korea . The first is a survey by Chi (1975)2 
who asked a sample of United States and Japanese firms operating in 
Korea to rank various motives for investing in Korea. 
For both the United States and Japanese firms the most important 
fact or was the availability of relatively inexpensive labour. The high 
growth rate of the Korean economy was, however, more important for the 
Japanese firms than for the United States firms, but their view 
regarding the importance of a large domestic market was reversed . 
A recent survey conducted by a Korea University team (1974)3 gives 
a clear-cut indication of motivation for DFI in the majority of the 
firms covered . Their top-most motive was to take advantage of favourable 
labour supply, namely, low wages for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. 
A little more than 15 per cent of the firms said that their main motive 
was to secure overseas export markets through Korea-based production. 
Thus, the combination of favourable labour supply conditions and export-
market-orientation was stated as the main motive in about half of the 
firms covered. Unfortunately, this study does not distinguish the 
motivating factors between United States DFI and Japanese DFI. 
(1) Y.S. Chang (1971), op.cit., 
(2) Chi (1975), op,cit., 
(3) Korea University team survey (1974), op.cit., 
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The third study of DFI In Korea is a survey carried out by 
Chung (1976)1. He found that the incentives offered by the Korean 
Government were of primary importance is prefered to the considerations 
of relatively inexpensive labour availability. 
According to a Korean -Development Institute (KDI)2 survey on joint 
venture firms in 1974, the main motive on the part of Korean partners 
was found to be closely related to overseas export marketing. 
In many cases, the motives (for example (i) to export their 
products directly to their foreign partner firms, (ii) to utilize 
foreign brand names and management knowhow for export marketing, (iii) 
import advanced technology) for the import of technology and raw 
materials were found to be related to export-oriented production. By 
and large, the maIn motives of the part of the domestic partners in 
joint-venture firms as reported In the KDI survey is closely in line 
with thos e of foreign investors as reported in the Korea University 
survey. This indicates that the main motives for investment from the 
standpoint of both foreign investors and their local partners has been 
3 increasingly oriented toward exports in recent years. The fifth study 
of DFI in Korea is a recent survey by the Economic Planning Board (EPB)4. 
It is interesting to discover that the findings of the motivational 
factors in this survey are consistent with Allen's (1973) two categories, 
even though the latter does not distinguish between the motivational 
factors of United States and Japanese DFI. Details of this survey are 
contained in Table 3-6. However, these five studies indicate that In 
terms of the motives for investing in Korea there is almost no 
consistent difference between United States DFI and Japanese DFI. This 
result might be not only due to sampling biases but also they did not 
distinguish the motivational behaviour between United States OFI and 
Japanese DFI . 
(1) Chung (1976), op. cit., 
(2) KOI (1974), op. cit ., 
(3) S.H. Jo, (1977), op. cit., p.10. 
(4) EPB, ' Economic Analysis ', (1980), op. cit., 
TABLE 3-61MOTIVATING FACTORS IN KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (1980) 
Investment Motives 
(only manufacturing industries) 
1. High rate of Investment 
Profitability 
2. Securing, maintaining and/ or 
developing of an overseas market 
3. To secure the low-cost and high 
qualify labour (Inexpensive 
labour) 
4. To secure industrial-location 
site 
5. Tax prestiges and var10US 
incentives offered by Host 
country 
6. Political and social stability 
(including relations 




















It should be pointed out, however, that whatever the results of 
suchslliVeys may be,they cannot answer the question why United States 
DFI in Korea is domestic-market-oriented and Japanese DFI in Korea 
export-oriented. 
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Why did United States and Japanese firms choose different market-
orientation when they met the same investment environment prevailing 1n 
Korea? Is the answer to this question to be found not only in the 
conditions that prevailed in Korea and thus attracted these fjrms to 
invest there, but also in the factors that are specific to the firms 
making investment decisions? In order to find out the answer in the 
factors that are specifi c to the firms making investment Jecision, we 
explain the above different market-orientation between United States OFI 
and Japanese DFI in terms of the monopolistic theory of DFI . 
(1) The survey covers 593 foreign firms which is responded and operating 
in Korea. Total foreign firms is 785 firms at th e end of 1979. 
It is by now widely accepted that a firm making DFI is motivated by 
its desire to exploit an advantage, an intangible asset, that it has 
acquired in its own home market. 1 The fundamental assumption of the 
monopolistic theory of DFI is that the firm that invests for direct 
product 1n a foreign market is at a disadvantage compared to local firms 
because of its unfamiliarity with local market conditions and that it 
3 inevitably incurs high information costs than do its local counterparts 
The argument required, therefore, that the investing foreign firm must 
possess some type of firm-specific, rent-yiefding advantages (for 
example, a superior knowledge in either production technology, marketing 
or management). The firm will, therefore, have an incentive to extend 
its use once it has acquired the advantage and thus to increase the 
quasi-rent, and that these advantages be sufficiently great to offset the 
higher information costs of its alien status if it is to operate 
competitively in a foreign market. That is, the advantages must outweigh 
the disadvantages and make higher returns possible4 . Thus, the essential 
characteristic of such an advantage is its non-marketability and firm-
specificity . 
Because of this assumption the investing firms are necessarily found 
ln oligopolistic markets in which only relatively large-scale firms with 
some firm-specific advantages can survive. 5 
Now we ra1se another question (which 1S related to its non-
marketability and firm-specificity) . What 1S the market-orientation of 
(1) See, for example, Caves (J971), Johnson (1970) and Kindleberger (1969) 
(2) This summary of the monopolistic theory is in part based on the 
T. Ozawas' article, 'Peculiarities of Japan's Multinationalism' op.cit., 
(3) f-or this vi e\IJ, see Stephen II. lIymer, the Tnternat i onal Opera tions 
of atiollJ.l Firms: J. Study of DF1 (Cambriuge, ~1ass: The ~lIT Press 
1976); Charles P. Kindleberger, American Business Abroad ( ew Haven: 
Yale Univ. Press, 1969); and R.E. Caves, 'International Corporations: 
the Industriol Econondcs of Of-I', Economica, vol.38 (1971), pp .1- 27. 
(4) Japanese Investment in Southeast Asia, op .cit., p.199. 
(5) St ephen Hymes, Charles Kindleberger and R. Caves (Hymer-Kindleberger-
Caves Model), among others, emphasized that Of-I occurs in industries 
characterized by oligopolistic market structures in both home and 
host countries. 
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a firm possessing such advantage? It will depend on the phase of the 
' product cycle' in which the firm finds itself. 1 If its product lS 
relatively new, the firm maximizing the rent from its advantage will 
make domestic-market-oriented OFI, thereby increasing the total sum of 
rent from its operation at home and abroad. For example, a schematic 
presentation of the United States trade position in the product life 
cycle shows the pattern from domestic-market-oriented OFI to export-
2 
oriented if the firm makes OFI at the stage of the 'product cycle' . 
Diagram I shows that the effect on United States trade of the movement of 
efficient production facilities from the United States to LOC is shown In 
the schematic presentation. Such a firm will search for countries where 
its advantage can be fully exploited, and these will be countries with 
demand appropriate for its product. Later when the product has become 
a prosaic, conventional one through its long existence, the firm will 
have lost its advantage in product technology, management and non-
location-specific marketing technique. It may, however, still retain its 
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Diagram I. A schematic presentation of the United States 
Trade position in the Product Life Cycle. 
Sources: L.T. Wells (ed), 'The Product Life Cycle and International 
Trade', (1972), p.1S 
(1) For a fuller statement of the 'product-cycle' theory, see Vernon 
(1966), and L.T. Wells (ed) (1972). The Product Life Cycle and 
International Trade. 
(2) L.T. Wells (ed), op.cit., p.1S 
(3) Lee (1979), op.cit., p.7-9 
If thi s firm happens to be located in a country with relatively 
expensive labour, it may be able to maximize the rent from this 
advantages by having the product made either by its foreign subidiary 
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or by a foreign firm under its own brand-name. Therefore, if the firm 
makes DrI at this stage of the 'product cycle' , it will be export-
oriented. But, to repeat, this firm will no longer possess an advantage 
in production technology, management and non-location-specific marketing 
technique. The 'product-life-cycle' theory expounded by R. Vernon offers as 
a valuable explanation the motivation for DFI within an oligopolistic 
framework of industrial enterprises . The theory states essentially that 
Slnce new products or processes are bound to be imitated by and introduced 
in other countries, innovating firms may decide to move into foreign 
markets for themselves whenever such threat becomes imminent. 
In other words, they try to retain control of their innovations 
by establishing their own production facilities, either wholley or jointly 
owned overseas. It is interesting that overseas production of a new 
product 1n terms of Vernon' s (1966) view is essentially of a defensive 
nature, 1n contrast to the aggressive nature of the action implied in 
the Galbraithian model of the technostructure. l 
In short, it is of importance to make clear that American DFI 
may be explained by the product cycle approach. 
As pointed out by Kindleberger (1969)2, one of the corollaries of 
the hypothesis that a firm undert akes OFI in order to exploit is non-
marketable, firm-specific advantages in production technology, 
management and mark eting is that the firm will want to maintain the 
control of its foreign operation with its foreign partners and will thus 
(1) Galbraith interprets overseas investment essential ly as the rational 
behaviour of big oligopolistic corporations nurtured in an advanced 
cnpitalist economy like that of United States. In a mature stage of 
cap·taljslll what he cal l s ' a technostructure' comes into existence. 
The t echnos tructure is a complex of scientists, engineers , and 
technician s in the fields of management, marketing and production, 
hired by a big corporation. It is a planning system built on 
' collective intelligence' and on the authority organisation. IIis 
model posits an aggressive effort of the efficient planning system 
to triumph over both the domestic and the overseas market. 
(2) For more details, see his American Business Abroad, (1969) pp . 27-33 . 
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prefer 100 per cent ownership to joint ventures or minority holdings. 
The reason for this predilection for control is the fin1's des ire to 
retain its special advantage and thus the rent from the advantage, Slnce 
the loss of control will entail sharing the advantage and the rent with 
local partners in the short run and probably a complete appropriation of 
the advantage in the long run. 1 This sort of argument is worthwhile 
resting and applying to the case of Korea~ 
3. EVIDENCE OF HYPOTHESIS 
Now, in this section, in order to explain the difference 1n their 
market-orientation between United States OFI and Japanese OFI, we 
establish the hypothesis that motivating factors for United States OFI 
in Korea were non-marketable, firm-specific advantages in production 
technology, management and marketing technique whereas a motivating factor 
for Japanese OFI in Korea was a non-marketable, firm-and-location-specific 
advantage in marketing technique and not in product and management 
(hypothesis II). As no direct observation on the firm's possession of the 
advantage yet exists, a test of hypothes is II may be made indirectly 
by carrying out an empirical verification of the corollary which suggested 
1n Kindleh erger' s paper (1969). 
(1) Lee (1979), op.cit., p.9 
(2) According to Behrman's (1969) study, there is a definite preference, 
among United States oligopolistic firms for wholly-owned affiliates, 
for example, during the six-and-a-half year period, the percentage 
of new establishment that were wholly-own ed ranged from 83 per cent 1n 
Canada to 26 per cent in India, Pakistan and Ceylon ... The 
indication which maybe drawn is that U.S. parents move toward a 
partnership only when they are pushed to do so by governmental or 
other constraints. However, the aggregat e figures hide an important 
change which has taken place during the 60's and 70's in the 
motivational pattern. For the local-market investments, there has 
been a relaxation of the attitudes toward s having full control or 
o\vllC'r~hip the compC'tition from cOlintTi C's s lI c h Cl S .JClr Cln durin g the 
60's and 70's (whose companies reveal a de s ire to enter joint-
ventures) has reinforced this. 
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The ownership pattern of United States and Japanese DFI in Korea 
1 has been shown by the pioneer study of Lee (1969) . Table 3-7 shows the 
ownership patterns of United Stat es and Japanese DFI 1n Korea. 
TABLE 3-7 OWNERSIIIP PATTERN OF DIRECT rOREIGN INVESTMENT IN KOREA (1962-74) 
(on arrival basis) 
Share of Foreign No. of investment Projects 
ownership U.S. Japanese 
50 - 100% 71 (73%) 255 (48%) 
0 - 49.9 % 26 (27%) 274 (52%) 
Total 97 (100%) 529 (100%) 
Source: EPB, 'The Current State of Foreign Investment', ROK, 1975. 
As seen 1n Table 3-7, 73 per cent of United States investment 
projects 1n Korea have United States ownership of 50 per cent or more 
and only 27 per cent have United States ownership of less than 50 per 
2 
cent. In other words, three-quarters of the United States investment 
projects in Korea can be said to be controlled by United States 
investors and only a quarter controlled by Korean partners. In order 
to check the validity of Lee's (1979) study of ownership pattern, 
(1) Lee op.cit., pp.9-11 
(2) In establishing the focus of control over joint-ventures in Korea, 
50 per cent of equity ownership appears appropriate as a critical 
value . When foreign investment is for a joint-venture, in mo s t 
cases ownership is shared by one Korean and one foreign firm. 
Even when more than one foreign investor is involved, very 
rarely are there more than two investors . Consequently, minority 
control is ~ very unlikely possibility for joint-venture s in 
Korea. 
another ownership pattern from the recent survey by EPB 1S shown 
by Table 3-8. 
TABLE 3_8 1 OWNERSHIP PATTERN OF DFI IN KOREA (1962-78 .6) 
Share of Foreign 
ownership 
so - 100% 
a - 49.9 % 
Total 












Table 3-7 and 3-9 do not show the ownership patterns of major 
United States corporation (oliopolistic firms) in Korea. Table 3-10 
however shows clearly the ownership patterns of the two groups of United 
States investors: those on the list of Fortune's sao, 86 per cent of whom 
control their Kore an investments, and those not on the list, 68 per cent 
of whom exercise controlling investment. 
As another confirmation of this evidence, it appears celarly that 
the more technological, capital int ens ive industries like petroleum an d 
chemicals, measuring machines, and e lectronic equipment by United States 
major corporations, s how a predilection for more than SO per cent 
foreign ownership (SO - 100 per cent). 3 
(1) Table 3-8 covers the period from 19 62 to 1978.6 and ownership pattern 
of DFI in Korea has changed over time, The data in Table 3-7 can be 
compared with Table 3-8. 
( 2) Lee (19 79), 0 p. cit., p. 7 an d p. 42 . 
(3) For eX~lple, if we see Table 3-9 , we find high rate of proportion 
of jnvestment 01110 unt by UniteJ States f -irms \VLth SO less 100 
ownership (which is supposed to comprise the major United States 
corporations more than SO per cent at least). See the examples, 
petroleum-chemicals (80 per cent) , measuring and metallics, 
machinery industry (96 . 9 per cent) and electronic and electric 
equipment industry (99.4 per cen t). 
so 











made up articles and 
related products 
50 - 100 
a - 49.9 
Total 
Paper, printing and 
publishing and 
related products 
50 - 100 




50 - 100 
a - 49.9 
Total 
Non-metall ic minera l s 
and related products 
50 - 100 




50 - 100 





50 - 100 
a - 49.9 
Total 
No. of Investment 
firm by country 



















Electric and Electronic 
equipment 
50 - 100 14 60 
o - 49.9 2 49 
Others fvlanufact. 
50 - 100 1 13 
o - 49.9 1 21 
Total 2 34 
Tobacco and Food 
50 - 100 5 3 
a - 49.9 7 11 
Total 12 14 
Proportion of Investment 
amount by country 
U.S. Japan 
per cent 























47.1 65 . 2 
52.9 34 . 8 
100 100 
TABLE 3-10 OIVNERSHIP PATTERN OF UNITED STATES OFI IN KOREA (1962-74) 
(on arrival basis) 
Share of United States Total number of 
Type of ownership Projects 
Investor 
50 - 100% o - 49.9% 
Major corporations 25 (86%) 4 (14%) 29 (100%) 
Non-major 
Corpora t 1 on s 46 (68%) 22 (32%) 68 (100%) 
Source: EPB, The Current States of Foreign Investment, ROK, 1975 . 
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In short, the evidence from Table 3-10 is certainly consistent with 
the corollary (this corollary means, a firm which makes OFI in ordcr to 
exploit its non-marketable, firm-specific advantage in production 
technology, management and marketing will prefer 100 per cent ownership 
to joint-ventures or minority holdings because of the firm's desire to 
retain its special advantage and thus the rent from the advantage) and 
thus is also consistent with hypoth esis II, which is OFI in Korea by 
United States firms, especially by large oligopolistic firms is made 
mostly in order to exploit their non-marketable, firm-specific advantages 
in production technology, management and marketing. 1 
In contrast with United States OFI in Korea, a majority of 
Japanese investment projects in Korea, 52 per cent, is controlled by local 
partners and the remainder, 48 per cent, by Japanese investors as shown 
in Table 3-7. 
(1) Consequcntly, from Table 3-10, minority control by major United 
States corporations lS a very unlikely possibility for joint-
ventures in Korea. 
The evidence from Table 3-7 is not consistent with the widely 
accepted hypothesis on OFI . 1 Furthermore, as noted in the preceding 
section, the market-orientation of Japanese OFI in Korea is not 
consistent with the hypothesis either. 
What are then the motivating factors for Japanese OFI 1n Korea? 
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As we established the hypothesis II 1n the beginning of this section 
three, i t mi ght be true that one of the motivating factors 1S the desire 
of Japanese investors to exploit their advantage primarily 1n marketing 
which is location-specific as well as non-marketable and firm-specific. 
Another corollary of the hypothesis II that a firm makes OFI in 
order to exploit is non-marketable, firm-specific advantage 1n production 
technology, management and marketing is, as pointed out by Vaitsos (1974)2, 
that the firm 'will want to achieve their monopolistic gains by using 
patents as powerful strategic weapons, and for this reason, the firm will 
thus prefer patents-holding technology varticularly in regard to their 
r.10St advanced technoloEies . The reason for this predilection for control 
is the firm ' s desire to achieve its firm-specific advantage in production 
technology and thus the patent is regarded as the source of 
monopolistic gain. A test of hypothesis II may be made indir'ectly 
by carrying out an empirical verification of the corollary. 
(1) In short, the accepted theory of OFI does not explain Japanese OFI 
in Korea. Because minority ownership pattern of Japanese OFI in 
Korea is not consistent with the widely accepted hypothesis on OFI 
that a firm which makes OFI in order to exp loit is non-marketable, 
firm-specific advantage in production technology, management and 
marketing will want to maintain the control of its foreign operation 
with its foreign partners and will thus prefer 100 per cent owner-
ship to joint-ventures or minority holdings due to the firm's 
desire to retain its specia l advantage and thus the rent from the 
advantage. 
(2) Vaitsos (1974);'Patents Revisted!, their Function in Developing 
Countries', Charles Cooper, ed., Science, Technology and 
Development, op.cit., p.91. 
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The Table 3-11 presents the patent pattern of United States and 
Japanese DFI In Korea. Each country's introduction of technology lS 
divided into two groups: one group consisting of the patent-holding 
technology, and the other non-patents-holding technology. United States 
shows the preference of patent-holding technology in Table 3-11 
relatively and absolutely than Japan. 
* TABLE 3-11 PATENT PATTERN OF UNITED STATES FIRMS AND JAPAN FIRMS (1962-78) 
Non-patent Patent-holding Total 
Technology Technology 
Japan 348 (68%) 167 (32%) 515 
United States 68 (48%) 74 (52%) 142 
416 241 657 
18.73 Degree of confidence 99.5 per cent significant 
3.841, V = 1 
Tahle 3-12 also shows the patent patterns of major United States 
and Japanese in Korea. Major United States firms are those on the list 
of Fortune's 500 (1979). 
** TABLE 3-12 PATENT PATTERN OF MAJOR UNITED STATES FIRMS AND JAPAN FIRMS 
(1962-78) 
Non-patent Patent Holding Total 
Technology Technology 
Japan 348 (68%) 167 (32%) 515 
Major United 32 (40%) 49 (60% 81 States 
* 
** 
380 216 596 
X2 = 22.42 Degree of Confidence 99.5 per cent significant. 
Source of this data was checked against 'Handbook of Technology 
Transfer' (in Korean) (1978) by EPB. 
Four main industry cover the most salient fields of technology 
transfer from United States and Japan, which is machinery 
industry, electronics, electrical industry, petro-chemical 
industry and metallic industry during 1962-1978. 
I\s shown 1n Table 3-12, 68 per cent of Japanese introduction of 
technology has non-patent-holding technology and only 32 per cent have 
patent-holding technology in Korea. 
In contrast, 60 per cent of major United States firms have patent-
holding technology. This evidence (see Table 3-12) is certainly 
consistent with the hypothesis II that OFI in Korea, by United States 
firms, especially that by the large, oligopolistic firms, are made 
mostly in order to exploit their non-marketable, firm-specific advantage. 
In contrast with United States, Japanese OFI is dominated by non-
patent-holding technology. This evidence is not consistent with Vaitsos's 
argument. 
What are then the motivating factors for Japanese OFr in Korea? 
As 1S mentioned by Lee (1979)1 earlier, one of the factors 1S the desire 
of Japanese investors to exploit their advantage primarily 1n marketing 
which is location-specific as well as non-marketable and firm-specific, 
as we established in hypothesis II. 
It seems that they have acquired this advantage in their domestic 
and export markets by establishing good-will among their customers. For 
the Japanese investors OFI is an investment for increasing the gains from 
this advantage by achieving their products at lower costs. Because the 
advantage is location-specific, it can not be transferred to their Korean 
partners engaged in production and there is, therefore, no strong 
incentive to exercise control over their operations in Korea. 2 Also, 
because the advantage lies in location-specific marketing skill, it 
follows that the investment tends to be highly export-oriented, the 
(1) C.II. Lee (1979), op.cit., pp.13-14. 
(2) Ibid. 
general tendency of export-oriented-market orientation. Since Japan 
experienced an acute shortage of labour particularly in small and 
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medium Slze firms, starting in the second hald of the 1960's, as pointed 
out by Ozawa (1972)1, it appears that Japanese investors are taking 
advantage of the abundant supply of relatively inexpensive labour in 
Korea and they are thus reaping larger rent from their marketing advantage 
in Japan and their export markets. 
Another factor that would have to be taken into account beyond 
tllose factors for Japanese OF! in Korea is, as pointed out by Ozawa (1979)2, 
the benefit from internalising markets in Korea can contribute to explain 
the advantages of Japan's overseas investment. Also, it is expected that 
an additional factor that has facilitated Japanese OFI is the existence 
of an institution unique to Japan: general trading companies. 
In case of Japanese OFI in Korea, the benefit from internalization 
to Japan investors arose primarily from the shortage of capital and 
foreign exchange prevailing in Korea. For Japanese investors in Korea, 
the cost of internalization was possibly the lowest that could ever be 
expected for OFI in any country. There were tax incentives offered by 
the Korean Government. But far more important than tax incentives was the 
minimal additional cost of communication attributable to internalization. 3 
Given the cultural and linguistic as well as geographical proximity of 
Korea and Japan, the internalization of a market through OFI could not 
have imposed much of an additional cost of communication to the Japanese 
investors. It seems, consequently that internalization through OFI 
in Korea brought then a great benefit at a very small cost. 
(1) T. Ozawa (1972), op . cit., 
(2) T. Ozawa (1979), op.cit., 
(3) C.H. Lee (1979), op.cit., 
CIIAPTER '4 
THE EVIDENCE ON KOJIMA: THE CASE OF KOREA 
I. U.S. TYPE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER VS. JAPANESE TYPE TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER 
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Technology transfer has been considered one of the maIn benefits 
associated with overseas investment. It is difficult to obtain any real 
measure of the benefits and costs which do accrue to the host country on 
even to determine the extent of technology transfer. In the transfer of 
technology, mainly through DFI, it is most important for developing 
countries to choose carefully what kind of industry and what type of 
technology tJley had better receive: as Kojima pointed out, is the most 
suitable manufacturing industry to developing countries 'traditional 
industry' which is labour-intensive, well-standardized and price-
competitive? Is this the kind of industry which Japanese DFI has trans-
planted so far to neighbouring developing countries? Kojima1 identifies 
and analyses two types of technology transfer, Japanese type technology 
transfer and United States type technology transfer which are based on 
comparative advantages in improving productivity. 
In this section, we expose the core of both Japanese and 
American transfer of technology to developing countries, and summarIze 
the most important aspects of that of Japanese type transfer of 
technology compared to that of the United States as seen by Kojima. 
In general, Japanese technology, exported to developing countries 
IS quite different in nature from that directed to advanced 
countries. The latter consists largely of patented, high-level 
technology involving chemicals (for example, pllarmaceuticals) 
and electronic products (for example, diodes, special condensers, 
wire and memory, etc.) . In contrast, the technology transferred by Japan 
to uevelopill ~. cOllntri es is not so much s pecifjc prouuctloll techniques but 
(1) K. Kojima, 'Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries', 
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economic, 1977, June. 
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rather know-how or general industrial expe~ience involving not the 
latest but mature techniques. It is given in the form of know-how or In 
the form of general industrial experlence, covering a wide spectrum of 
production activities such as assembly techniques (for instance, cars, 
trucks, radios, television sets, sewing machines, coolers, refrigerators), 
material selection, combination, and treatment techniques (for example, 
dyes, inks and paints), machine operation and maintenance techniques 
(for example, spinning and weaving) provision of blue prints and 
technical data, training of engineers and operators, plant layout, 
selection and installation of machinery and equipment, quality and cost 
controls and inventory management. This type of rather general and 
comprehensive technical transfer inevitably involves a great deal of 
person-to-person contact from the very top down to routine operations. 
Therefore, the training of engineers and operators 1S perhaps one of the 
most crucial phases .of technology transfer. Needless to say, personnel 
training is often a highly labour-intensive process, requ1r1ng a 
considerable amount of manpower on the side of transfering firms. 
1 Terutomo Ozawa emphasizes this particular aspect of Japan's technology 
transfer to developing nations. 
(1) Japanese technology transferred to developing countries, as already 
pointed out, is not so much specific production techniques but rather 
know-how or general industrial experience involving not the latest but 
mature techniques. This type of technology often requires the actual 
participation of the transferors at the production and management levels 
for a considerable period of time. Because transferred technology 1S so 
mature and standardized, developing countries do not fully assess the 
economic value of industrial technology and tend to consider it almost 
a free good. 
(1) Terutomo Ozawa, 'Transfer of Technology from Japan to Developing 
Countries, op. cit., (1971) 
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(2) The mechanism of Japan's technology transfer to developing countries 
is less capital-intensive or to put it more appropriately, is highly 
labour-intensive, a great deal of manpower being involved on the part of 
both the transferors and transferees. Japan may prove to have a 
comparative advantage of this human-centered activity of transfering 
industrial knowledge to her neighbouring countries where socio-cultural 
conditions are not totally dissimilar. This is supported by the fact 
that Japan's DFI have been concentrated on small-sized labour-intensive 
industries. 
(3) The very interesting aspect of the Japanese type technology transfer 
is characterized by the link between mature and standardized technology, 
joint-ventures, and the unique role of Japanese trading firms. 
Being unable to expect profits from the sale of standardized technology, 
transferors try to compensate for the bargain sole of knowledge by 
securing, or monopolizing, the supply of intermediate goods such as raw 
materials, parts and components. To this end, capital ownership and 
management participation become strategically important1 The unique 
role of Japanese trading companies is pointed out as "intermediating the 
shipping of required machinery, equipment, raw materials, and semi-
finished products from Japan and the exporting, if any, of the overseas 
venture's products overseas". "Generally speaking, 50 per cent of the 
total capital of these ventures is locally-owned in a developing 
country, 25 per cent is owned by the Japanese manufacturer involved, 
and 25 per cent is financed by a trading company.2 
(4) The technology transferred by Japanese firms to developing countries 
is largely knowhow or modernization experience and still associated with 
standardized production techniques. This type of technology can not be 
easily embodied in capital equipment, blue-prints, or instruction sheets 
(1) Ibid., p.12 
(2) Ibid., p.13 
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but is mostly embodied in labor at all levels of operation. Under those 
circumstances, technical assistance must be provided on the site of 
actual operations until transferees acquire the necessary skills 
through experience. On this account, joint-ventures appear to be the 
most effective form of organization, since both parties to the contract 
will be involved In the common pursuit of profits, will be sharing 
responsibilities and solving technical and managerial problems as they 
arlse. 
Most technology transfer and DFI to developing countries through 
American firms has distinct characteristics from that through Japanese 
firms . American manufacturing firms usually undertake DFI in the most 
sophisticated industries even in developing countries. Kojima argues 
that these industries rank at the top of the United States' corporation 
advantage and the investment seeks to maintain and extend their 
monopolistic or oligopolistic position in the host country through 
superior advantage in their technology, marketing and world wide network. 
This type of DFI implies a transfer of technology from the industry 
In which a very large technological gap exists between the providing and 
recelvlng countries (therefore Kojima call it "reverse-order" technology 
transfer) and Kojima contrasts that ffi aunique characteristics of Japan's 
technology transfer to developing countries which can be theor etically 
described as an "orderly transfer of technology" which begins in these 
industries where the technological gap between providing and recei v'ing 
countries or firms is smallest and, accordingly, the transfer of 
technology is easier and its spread effects larger. American type of 
technology transfer is actually not only very difficult but also 
actually results in "no transfer" taking place, that is, a mere out-
station of new technology transfer. 
American oligopolistic enterprises usually set up wholly-owned 
subsic1i c:-; o r "L' IlI ... · !;l L':-; " in c.levclopjn g countrie s jn produc ing f-j~e mere 
sophisticated and differentiated products in order to exploit their 
quasi-monopolistic advantages in third world markets. 
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Now, a simple, important question 1S raised: Can this description 
of two different types of technology transfer between America and Japan 
be applied in Korea? This means that Japanese technology transfer 
to Korea is generally not so much specific production techniques but 
rather knowhow, general, industrial experience, mature and ~tandardized 
technology, whilst American technology transfer to Korea consists largely 
of patented, high-level technology involving chemicals (for example, 
Pharmaceuticals) and electronic products (for example, diodes, special 
condensers, wire memory). 
In other words, this question 1S consistent with hypothesis III 
that there is a very small gap between Korean technology level (host 
country) and Japanese technology level (investing country) by OFI, 
relatively but a large gap between Korean technology level and American 
technology level by DFI. 
The present study does not attempt to provide the answer about 
Kojima ' s assumption that the smaller the technological difference to 
developing countries between the investing and host country, the easier 
it is to transfer and improve the technology in the latter. Owing to the 
dynamic aspect of technology transfer, we can not say simply that mature, 
standard technology has more beneficial spill-over effects than high 
level of technology. 
2 . EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
According to Kojima's hypothesis, oW1ng to the degree of 
development and industrial structure, he assumes that there are 
significant differences in the level of technology transfer between the 
United States and Japan. He suggests the United States level of 
technology tr~lllsfer IS higher than that of Japan. In other words, he 
suggests that there 1S a very small gap between Korean technology level 
(host country) and Japanese technology level (investing country), 
relatively but a large gap bet\>Jeen Korean technology level and that of 
the United States. 
As a way of checking the validity of the hypothesis, the list of 
United States firms and Japanese firms that had transferred technology 
to Korea was checked against the list of their contents of technology 
transfer from the period I (62-71), period II (72-75), to period III 
(76-78). (See Table 4-1). 
* TABLE 4-1 PATTE~\ OF CONTENTS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BY COUNTRY AND BY PERIOD 
Contents of (1) (2) (3) (4 ) (5) (6) (7) 
Tech- Knowhow Knowhow Knowhow Knowhmv Patents Patents Patents Sub-total 
Indust . ology Training Brand P-training Knowhow Knowhow Knmvhow and 
& Country (personne 1) Brand P-training Brand atent Total ~ 
period 8 U.S. 1 1 10% 10 
62-71 24 Japan 23 1 6 11% 54 
72-75 3 U.S. 1 1 1 4 2 2 57% 14 (45) ~Iachinery 14 Japan 18 4 2 7 9 2 32% 56 
5 U.S. 1 14 1 71% 21 76-78 25 Japan 10 1 50 7 3 63% 95 (205) 
period 7 U.S. 1 1 1 1 27% 11 
62 71 0 Japan 22 1 0% 53 Electrics 5 U. S . 4 1 50% 10 (40) 
and 72-75 20 Japan 9 3 2 5 1 3 21% 43 ElectTonics 3 U.S. 4 8 1 3 63% 19 76-78 11 Japan 8 1 2 27 56% 48 (1-+3) 
period 8 U.S. 1 6 1 44% 16 
62-71 26 Japan 7 2 1 4 1 12% 41 Petro- U.S. 1 9 1 91% 11 (40) Chern. 72-75 12 Japan 8 1 7 5 36% 33 
Process 2 U.S. 1 8 2 77% 13 (112) 
Technology 76-7'8 18 J apal1 1 1 1 15 2 45% 38 
period 4 U. S. 1 20% 5 
62-71 9 Jopan 7 1 6% 17 
3 U.S. 1 0% 4 (17) 
Metals 72-75 10 Japan 8 1 4 17% 23 
76-78 5 U.S. 1 1 1 38% 8 7 Japan 2 3 2 36% 14 (5-+) 
-- - - ----- ----- - -
,-.. 
I--
Source: EPB, Handbook of Technology Introduction, 1980. 
* The data is tabulated by using SPSS technique. 
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The contents of technology transfer have been broken down into 
seven closely interrelated categories. An interesting point is that the 
evidence from the Table 4-1 gIves some good explanation of above 
characteristics of Japanese type technology transfer. It seems that the 
main contents of Japanese technology transfer to Korea IS dominated by 
knowhow and personnel training, particularly during early period I 
(62-71) . 
Ilowever, throughout the period II (72-75) and III (76-78), the 
proportion of patent-holding technology in the contents of technology 
transfer by Japan is increased by 63 per cent (machinery), 56 per cent 
(electronics), 45 per cent (petro-chemicals) and 36 per cent (metallics) 
but still relatively lower per cent than for America. 1 
Therefore, can we clain that the training of engIneers and 
operators and general knowhow are perhaps the most crucial phases of 
Japanese type technology transfer? In contrast , American type technology 
transfer seems to consist largely of patented, high-level technology. 
It appears that the major technology transfer by United States has taken 
place by the patent-holding technology. However, we can not simply 
say that American level of technology transfer to Korea is higher than 
that of Japan without more careful approach, although the Table 4-1 shows 
some (slight) evidence to support the hypothesis. It seems that the 
contents of technology transfer depends on time and this is related 
significantly to tIle degree of industrialization in the host country, 
Korea. That is, the more rapid industrialization proceed from period I 
(62-71), II (72-75) to III (76-78), the higher proportion of high level 
technology (patent-holding technology) is increasing relatively (see 
Table 4-1 carefully). Also it appears that the contents of technology 
transfer depend on industry. In the petroleum-chemicals case, there 
exists a distinctive gap between American level of technology transfer 
and Japanese level of technology transfer through the period I, II 
and Ill. 
(1) See the Table 4-1 with patent per cent (composition). 
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In the machinery industry case, it does not provide any significant 
differences in the level of technology transfer between American firms 
and Japanese firms. It is interesting to note that the major high level 
of technology transfer in the machinery industry has taken place by 
Japanese firms. Throughout the period I, II and III, an interesting 
point is the fact that of the four main i ndustries, all of them had 
j ncreased the proportion of patent-holding technology,- both to American and 
Japanese technology transfer, due to the rapid economic development and 
change of structure of whole industries in Korea. An empirical 
investigation about this hypothesis will be conducted in the next sect ion 
more thoroughly_ 
3 . EMPIRICAL TEST: COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN U.S. LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER AND JAPANESE LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
(WITH EMPHASIS OF MACHINERY INDUSTRY CASE) 
Methodology: We classify total technology introduction during the period 
1962-1978.6 into two different groups: product technology and process 
technology by country (United States and Japan). Product technology 
includes electronics, electrical machinery, communication machinery 
including transportation equipment and so on. Process technology 
includes refinery-petroleum products, general chemicals, pharmaceutical 
chemicals and so on. As a case study of empirical investigation, we 
choose one of product-technology, machinery industry and then machinery 
industry 1S classifi ed by country (Japan and United States) and by 
period. As a case of process technology, we choose a refinery-
petroleum product industry including general chemicals. In this case 
study of machinery industry, we use SPSS technique to find out and 
explore whether there is a significant difference between United States 
level of technology transfer and Japanese level of technology transfer 
or not. 
Methodological explanation 1S as follows: 
(1) We classify total technology level in machinery industry 
of Korea into four different level s of category. As the criterion of 
classifying total t echnology i ntroduction for the present study, refer to 
Park's (1980)1 yardstick. We integrate the Hoffman-coefficient , ranking 
(1) E _ Y. Park (1980), ' 1ul tinationals and Technology Transfer I, KDI, 
(in Korean), to be published. 
index of technology intensity degree in United States industry, and 
A.D. Little company's evaluation of technology level. The example of 
four different technology levels In case of machinery industry is given 
in Table 4-2. 
TABLE 4-2 TECHNOLOGY LEVEL OF PRODUCTS IN CASE OF MACHINERY INDUSTRY 
(EXAMPLE) 
(1) High Top (First 
class level of Tech. 
· Space engineering 
and industry 
· Airplane industry 
· Products of 
computers 
· Automatic power 
plant industry 











(3) Middle tech. 
level 






































· railway car 
(freight car) 
· Condensor 
(4) Low tech. 
level 
· Bolts and nuts 
· Refrigerating 
M/C 











(2) We classify total technology introduction into three periods 
(1962-71, 1972-75, 1976-78), which is matching with levels of technology 
introduction and its frequencies. 
(3) We }luve 250 cases which covers total technology introduction 
from Japan (205 cases) and United States (45 cases) during 1962-1978 in 
, 
machinery industry of Korea. The period of technology introduction is 
classified into nine groups, which is (i) less than three years (YRS) , 
(ii) three YRS (iii) three to five YRS, (Iv) five YRS (v) five to ten 
YRS, (vi) ten YRS (vii) ten to fifteen YRS (viii) fifteen YRS and 
(ix) more than fifteen YRS. 
(4) By uS1ng SPSS technique, total contents of technology transfer 
from America and Japan are classified into seven categories, that 1S, 
(i) Knowhow, (ii) Knowhow, Training, (iii) Knowhow, Brand, (iv) Knowhow, 
Training, Brand, (v) Patents, Knowhow, (vi) Patents, Knowhow, Training, 
and (vii) Patents, Knowhow, Brand. 
(5) Main focus of this case study is glven to tabulating and cross-
tabulating country by technology level, country by contents of technology 
transfer (seven categories) and country by period (nine groups) by uSlng 
SPSS t echnique. The information of empirical findings collated 1n 
Table 4-2 gives full details. 
Empirical Findings 
Table 4-3 shows the comparative level of technology intro-
duction between United States and Japan during three periods (period I 
(62-71), period II (72-75), period III (76-78)). The proportion of high 
level technology like 2nd class level technology is increasing absolutely 
and relatively throughout period I, II and III for both the U.S. and Japan, 
Juc to l'<lpid ecollom jc deve lopmc nt ~lnd inJustrLai i z~tioll Jurillg 1970. 1 
(1) The proportion of 2nd high class technology }las changed from 30% 
(perioc1 I), SOQ6 (period II), to 52% (period ITT), relatively 
J~lp~lIl ' s proportion .is 31°0 (perioJ I), 39~0 (pcr.ioJ II), to 47 gu 
(period I I I) . 
66 
TABLE 4-3 MACHINERY PRODUCTS INDUSTRY (PRODUCT-TECHNOLOGY) 




U.S. 3 6 1 10 
Japan 17 32 5 54 
X2 * Total 20 38 = 0.018 6 64 
Period II 
(1972-75) 
U.S. 7 6 1 14 
Japan 22 32 2 56 
X2 * Total 29 38 = 1.07 3 70 
Period III 
(1976-78) Total 
U.S. 1 11 9 21 45 
Japan x 45 48 2 95 205 
X2 * Total 56 57 = 0.76 2 116 250 
* No, significant, at 99.5% 
The interesting aspect of this tendency is the fact that Japanese 
technology pattern has changed similarly with the U.S. technology pattern. 
An important finding of this case study is that there is no 
significant difference in the contents of technology level between U.S. 
and Japan throughout the period I, II, III, even though there is a slight 
evidence which shows a somewhat higher frequencies of 2nd class level 
technology in United States than Japan. But we do not accept this 
statistically as reliable evidence. 
Therefore, we reject the hypothe sis III that there:is II significant 
difference in the level of technology introduction between United States 
and JJpJn. Table 4-4 shows the same results, even though there is 
slight evidence which shows the high ratio of 2nd high class level 
technology in case of United States. 
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TABLE 4-4 TECHNOLOGY LEVEL BY COUNTRY (MACHINERY INDUSTRY) 
Level of 1 2 3 4 Row 
Technology Top High High Middle Low Total 
Japan 0 85 109 11 205 
U.S. 1 21 21 2 45 
Column 1 106 130 13 250 
Total 
J\noth er way of checking its validity, lS the evidence and 
proportion of patent-holding technology in the machinery industry. 
The Table 4-5 and 4-6 show no significant difference in . 
patent-holding technology, we regard patents as high-sophisticated 
technology. Our empirical study of correlation between patents and 
high-technology shows 0.795, quite highly, mutually related, in the case 
of the machinery industry. 















TABLE 4-6 PATENT PATTERN OF JAPAN AND MAJOR U.S. IN MACHINERY INDUSTRY 
(1962-78) 
Non-patent Patent-holding Total 
Technology Technology 
Japan 121 84 205 
Major 1 12 14 26 U.S. 
133 98 231 
(1) Maj or U. S. firms arc those \vhich are listed In Fortune ' s 500 ) the 
larges t, oligopolistic firms. 
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In other words, the finding of product-technology like machinery industry 
lS not consistent with hypothesis III. Several explanations can be 
attempted. Even in period I (62-71), at the early stage of industrializa-
tion Korea already had introduced the hjgh, 2nd class level of technology 
such as heavy diesel engine, bearing, working machinery from Japan as well 
as in periods II and III. It appears that some domestic forces (like 
Government's strong industrial policy to induce such a high technology 
product) can influence as the determinant of technology level in the 
machinery case . Again, the contents of technology transfer from Japan 
does not show the significant difference in technology level, compared 
with contents of technology transfer for United States, even during the 
period I (1962-71), needless to say periods II and III. Which fa'ctors, 
which determinants make it possible to introduce such a high level of 
technolo gy from J apan to Korea? This is a very interesting question and 
does, not seem to acrue the firm-specific or firm policies of investing 
countries (Japanese DFI), as Kojima pointed out. 
In short, it seems that the major determinants of technology level 
by DFI depend not only on firm-specificity (that is, firm-specific 
superior advantage in production technique or marketing) or firm policies 
of investing country, but also (a) investment climate of investing 
country,(b) technology level of host country (that is, the capacity of 
absorbing new technology), (c) comparative advantages In host country, 
and (d) Demand (market size of host country) expected by investing 
country,. The above explanation might be supplementary (harmonious) wi th 
the Kojima hypothesis and his explanation such as that investing country's 
different development structure make different levels of technology 
transfer . Does our empirical finding then not support Kojima's hypothesis? 
Lct's rCV1C\'; briefly the refincry-pctrolcum chemi ca ls industry 
as another case! The case of process-technology like refinery-petroleum 
chemicnls nnd gcncrn l chC'micnls inc1ust ry is considC'rC'd. We clnssify the 
process-technology into two parts, refinery-petroleum-chemicals industry 
and general chemicals industry. Generally speaking, refinery and 
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petrol eum chemicals has more pat ent-ho lding technology and highly 
sophisticated technology in contrast to general chemicals such as paints, 
wax dyes and adhesive agent. 
Table 4-7 shows a significant difference in technology level 
between United States and Japanese. In the highly-sophisticated 
technology like refinery-petroleum chemicals, the American level of 
technology in Korea is much higher than that of Japan, relatively and 
absolutely. Comparatively, Japan has transferred more low technology 
like general chemicals than America. 
In short, there .is a significant d.ifference in technology level 
between United States and Japan at least in process-technology like 
refinery-petroleum chemicals and general chemicals industry. 
* TABLE 4-7 PETRO-CHEMICALS AND GENERAL CHEMICALS PRODUCTS INDUSTRY 












x2 = 10.6 99.5 % V = 1 
V. Signif.icant 





Table 4-8 and 4-9 s ho w that there is a very significant difference 
In the technolo gy level of petro-chemicals and general chemicals industry 
hetween Ameri GIn ~ll1d Jnpnl1ese fl TillS. 
TABLE 4-8 PATENT TECHNOLOGY PATTERN OF PETRO-CHEMICALS AND GENERAL 
CHEMICALS INDUSTRY BY COUNTRY (JAPAN VS U.S.) (1962-78). 
Non-patent Patent-holding Total 
Technology 
Japan 78 34 112 
United States 13 27 40 
Total 91 61 152 
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TABLE 4-9 PATENT TECHNOLOGY PATTERN OF PETRO-CHEMICALS AND GENERAL 
CHEMICALS INDUSTRY BY COUNTRY (JAPAN VS MAJOR U.S.) (1962-78) 
Non-patent Patent-holding Total 
Technology 
Japan 78 34 112 
Major 4 21 25 United States 
Total 82 55 137 
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CIIAPTER 5 
CONCLUOI G REMARKS 
This study examines three propositions derived from Kojima's 
work. 
(1) We compared the market-orientation - export-orientation or 
domestic-market-orientation - of United States and Japanese OFI 1n Korea. 
The results are consistent with Kojima's observation that United 
States OFI is domestic-market-oriented and Japanese OFI is export-
oriented in Korea manufacturing industry. Besides the difference in 
market-orientation, an additional characteristic of OFI by the large, 
United States oligopolistic firms is the relatively large amount that 
they invest per project. TI1e fact that the United States OFI is 
controlled by United States investors may reflect in part however, the 
difficulty faced by ~leir Korean partners in raising capital sufficiently 
large to allow them a majority ownership . 1 In short, it seems that the 
size of investment for each project might contribute to the different 
pattern of ownership between the United States and Japan. 2 
(2) Several studies of the motivation for OFI were reviewed and the 
difference in the factors motivating United States and Japanese OFI in 
Korea analysed. It is shown that OFI in Korea by United States firms, 
especially that by the large oligopolistic firms is undertaken mostly to 
exploit non-marketable, firm-specific advantage in production technology, 
management and marketing. And it 1S shO\m that the accepted theory of 
OFI does not explain Japanese OFI 1n Korea. It seems that one of the 
factors is the desire of Japanese investors to exploit their advantage 
( 1) C .il. Lee lI9 79) J 0 p . cit. , 
(2) Given the relatively small SWllS involved in Japanese investment, it 
would not have he en difficult for Korea partners to acquire a 
majority ownership. 
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primarily in marketing which is location-specific1 as well as non-
marketable and firm-specific. However it seems that an advantage in 
location-specific marketing skill is not a sufficient condition for DFI 
in an otherwise perfectly competitive world. As pointed out by Ozawa 
(1979)2, the benefit from internalising markets in Korea can contribute 
to an explanation of the advantages of Japan's overseas investment. Also, 
it 1S shown that an additional factor that has facilitated Japanese DFI 
1S the existence of an institution unique to Japan: general trading 
compan1es. In the case of Japanese DFI in Korea, the benefit from 
internalization to Japan investors arose primarily from the shortage of 
capital and foreign exchange prevailing in Korea. For Japanese investors 
in Korea, the cost of internalization was possibly the lowest that could 
ever be expected for DFI in any country. There were tax incentives 
offered by the Korean government. But far more important than the tax 
incentives was the minimal additional cost of communication attributable 
to internalization. 3 Given the cultural and linguistic as well as 
geographical proximity of Korea and Japan, the internalization of a 
market through DFI could not have imposed much of an additional cost of 
communication to the Japanese investors. It seems, consequently, that 
internalization through DFI in Korea brought then a great benefit at a 
very small cost. 
In sum, Japan's DFI in Korea, given the above particular factors 
on Korean economy, as suggested by Ozawa, the more competitive the 
industry (that is, the less monopolistic or oligopolistic the industry 
and the less technologically sophisticated the product), the greater 
the need so far for Japanese industry to resort to offshore production4 
in Korea, the more Japanese DFI in Korea gain benefit through internal-
(1) Because the adv~ntnge 1 ies in locnti.on-speci fi c mdyketing sk i 11, j t 
C~I nnot be trClns f erred to their Kore~J n partners engaged in production 
and it follows that the investment tends to be highly export-oriented. 
(2) T. Ozawa (1979), op.cit., 
(3) C.II. Lee (1979), op . cit., 
(4) This is a phenomenon not envisioned 1n the monopolistic theory of DFI. 
ization of a market and its 'cross-the-national-rather-than-industry-
boundary' behaviour1 . 
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(3) According to Kojima's hypothesis, there are significant differences 
in the level of technology transfer between United States and Japan, 
owing to the degree of development and industrial structure. He suggests 
that the Unitecl States level of t echnology transfer is higher than that of 
Japan (hypothesis III). 
An important finding of the case study of machinery industry 1n 
Korea is that there is no significant difference 1n the level of 
technology transfer between United States and Japan throughout 
period I (1962-71), period II (1972-75) and period III (1976-78). This 
result clearly runs counter to Kojima's hypothesis, even though there is 
slight evidence which shows a somewhat higher frequency of second high 
class level technology in United States than Japan, although it is not 
statistically reliable evidence. Another way of checking the validity 
of hypothesis III, was to compare the ratio of patent-holding technology 
1n machinery industry between United States and Japan. The result also 
shows that there is no significant difference in the level of technology 
transfer between United States and Japan . 
One possible interpretation 1S that such an empirical finding 
(case study of machinery industry) 1S a unique and exceptional case. In 
other words, hypothesis III still can be applied and generalized to other 
industries in Korea with validity (for example, electronics and electric 
industry, textiles industry or petrochemical engineering industry and 
so on). 
(1) It should be pointed out that the internal reallocation of resources 
between industries may be far more costly than making OFI in the same 
industry . for inst~lnce, n t extile firm in .In.pan, even with abunclant 
funds may find it difficult to set up an electronics company in 
Japan but find it easy to go abroad to produce textile through 
internalizing the markets in Korea. This is why Japanese OFI are 
most prevalent in her contracting inclustrial sectors (for instance, 
a textile firm) seems to be best explained in terms of Kojima model 
(which emphasizes such sectors' motivation to transfer corporate 
production to developing countries where factor endowments are more 
favourable). 
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In fact, the case of process technology, refinery-petroleum 
chemical industry is consistent with hypothesis III, as was found 1n our 
test. There appears to be significant difference in the level of 
technology transfer bet\veen United States and Japan in process-technology 
like refinery-petroleum chemical industry. 
In short, a tentative conclusion is that the validity of Kojima's 
hypothesis III varies from industry-by-industry in Korean manufacturing 
industries. 
It seems that the validity of Kojima's hypothesis III also depends 
on time and this is related significantly to degree of industrialization 
1n the host country. For example, in our case study of the machinery 
industry, \vhen Korea was in an early stage of industrialization like 
period I (1962-71), it seems that there was some difference in the level 
of technology transfer between United States and Japan. However, the 
more rapid economic development and industrialization proceed during 
1970's, the higher proportion of high level technology (like second 
class level technology) is increasing absolutely and relatively through-
out period II (1972-75) and period III (1976-78) and both United States 
and Japan and the more there is no significant difference in level of 
technology transfer between United States and Japan. 
One implication is that this result may possibly be due to 
sampling biases, so the finding is not consistent with Kojima's hypothesis. 
It should be pointed out, however, that this empirical case study covers 
the total introduction of technology from Japan (205 projects) and from 
the United States (45 projects) during the period 1962-1978 1n the 
machinery industry of Korea. However, this case study does not cover 
the share of investment from Masan Export ~ree Zone 1 in Korean m~nufacturing 
(1) The foreign firms operating in lasan Export Free Zone after 1971 
are almost Japanese firms (98 per cent) and their motivation of 
investment are securing the low-cost, cheap labour forces, and do 
not lIl~lkc tC'chnology 1 iccl1cjng :'lgreclllcllts ,<,lith KOl'C';'lll p:'lrtl1CYS 
because their technology level is very low, simple, standardized 
technology, simple and labour intensive part-assembly, and those 
investments are very sensible to the change of investment climate 
<111 d L n c C Jl t 1 v e po 11 c y 0 f h 6 s t co un try, so are 1 ike 1 y tow i t h d r a \<,1 
easily from host country, Korea. 
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industries. Due to their specific activity and particularity, we 
exclude the amount of investment from Masan Export Free Zone. Therefore 
if we include those investments, mainly corning from Japanese OFI, it 
appears that the Kojima 's hypothesis has some validity in this specific 
area . 
It appears that the major determinants of technology level by OFI 
depends not only on firm-specificity (this means firm-specific superior 
advantage in production techniques, owing to the degree of development 
and industrial structure by Kojima, or firm-policy of investing country) 
but also (a) investment climate of investing country, United States and 
Japan, (b) technology level of host country (this means the capacity of 
absorbing new technology), (c) comparative advantage in host country, 
(d) demand (market size of host country), (e) industrial policy of host 
government and investment climate of host country, for example, Korean 
government's strong incentive policy to induce high level of technology 
from investing countries. These factors are worthwhile noting for 
further study, although this study has not provided evidence to 
substantiate all these conclusions. These are some of the factors that 
would have to be taken into account beyond those identified by Kojima. 
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